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Abstract
Oblivious transfer is a powerful cryptographic primitive that is complete for secure multi-party
computation. In oblivious transfer protocols a user sends one or more messages to a receiver,
while the sender remains oblivious as to which messages have been received. Protocols for
oblivious transfer cannot exist in a classical or fully-quantum world, but can be implemented
by restricting the users’ power.
The isolated qubits model is a cryptographic model in which users are restricted to single-qubit
operations and are not allowed to use entangling operations. Furthermore, all parties are allowed
to store qubits for a long time before measuring them.
In this model, a secure single-bit one-out-of-two randomised oblivious transfer protocol was
recently presented by Liu. Motivated by this result, we construct a protocol for secure string
one-out-of-two randomised oblivious transfer by simplifying and generalising the existing proof.
We then study for the first time interactive protocols for more complex two-party functionalities
in this model based on the security of our construction. In order to guarantee the composability
of our construction, users are restricted to measurement at the end of each sub-protocol. It is
then possible to construct secure one-out-of-two and one-out-of-k oblivious transfer protocols in
the isolated qubits model.
Moreover, we study secure password-based identification, where a user identifies himself to an-
other user by evaluating the equality function on their inputs, or passwords. We use the oblivi-
ous transfer constructions mentioned above as sub-protocols to construct a secure identification
protocol.
Finally, we prove that constructing a secure identification protocol non-interactively is impossi-
ble, even using oblivious transfer.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 History Of Cryptography: From Art To Science.
The word cryptography comes from the greek words κρυpiτό (“secret”) and γράφω (“write”). In
other words it defines the art of secret message transmission between two parties in a way that
the message remains unreadable to any third party (adversary). This definition is accurate for
the historical uses of cryptography but not for its modern form.
In the last century, cryptography has evolved from art to science that does not rely on the
obscurity of the encryption method but on formal mathematical definitions and rigorous secu-
rity proofs. Furthermore, modern cryptography deals not only with the problem of message
encryption but also with problems such as authentication, digital signatures and multi-party
computation.
In this section we give a brief overview of the history of cryptography and its evolution from
the art of message encryption to its modern forms.
1.1.1 First Steps: The Art Of Encrypting Messages
The practice of cryptography is as old as the transmission of messages. Closely linked to the
history of mankind, forms of encryption were developed independently in a number of places
and soon again forgotten as were the civilisations that used them.
According to Kahn [Kah96], cryptography has its roots in 1900 BC ancient Egypt, in the use
of unusual hieroglyphs, instead of the ordinary ones, in the tomb of a nobleman, Khnumhotep
II. Together with the construction of impressive burial monuments, the need to impress the
living took the form of decorating tombs with obscure encryptions. These cryptic puzzles did
for the first time intend to preserve the secrecy of the original text, at least enough to attract
the curiosity of passersby for the short time it would take to decrypt and read.
Although there are probably inumerable examples of these first forms of cryptography we note
its first known military use to transmit secret messages, the scytale. First mentioned around
the 7th century BC by Apollonius of Rhodes, used by the Spartans the scytale was a method to
transmit a message secretly. Plutarch gives a more detailed account of its use in Lives (Lysander,
19), two identical wooden rods, the scytalae, are used in the following way. A leather strap is
1
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wound around the scytale and then the message is written on it along the length of the rod (see
Figure 1.1a). The leather strap is then sent to the receiver of the message who has to wind it
around his scytale in order to read the message. If the message is intercepted, it cannot be read
unless a rod of the same diameter is used. It is furthermore hypothesized that this could be
a method for message authentication instead of encryption, that is only if the sender used the
correct scytale is the message readable by the receiver, thus making it more difficult to inject
false messages by a third party.
Through the next centuries, the most common use of cryptography was encryption of text
through ciphers by substitution of letters in a fixed way such as the Caesar’s cipher. The latter
uses a fixed left shift of the alphabet by three letters, i.e. A would be transcripted as D, B as
E, and so on. More complicated ciphers were developped following the same principle, using a,
possibly different, shift of the alphabet for every letter of the message, often defined by a secret
key.
The most prominent example of complex substitution ciphers is the use of rotor machines,
for example the Enigma and Lorentz cipher machines used in World War II (see Figure 1.1b).
These machines used a number of rotating disks (rotors) that implemented a complex, but fixed,
substitution of letters. For every keypress the position of the rotors would change thus using a
different substitution for every letter.
(a) Scytale (b) Lorenz rotor stream cipher machine
Figure 1.1: Examples of device dependent cryptographic implementations. Figure 1.1a The
scytale described in more detail in Section 1.1.1 (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Skytale.png) and Figure 1.1b The Lorenz SZ42, an example of a rotor cipher
machine (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Lorenz-SZ42-2.jpg).
1.1.2 Modern Cryptography
For more than twenty centuries cryptography focused mostly on the art of encrypting and
conveying secret messages, mainly for military purposes. A large number of very different and
sometimes very complex protocols were implemented, but they all relied on the secrecy of the
encryption method. Thus once the protocol was known by an adversary it was no longer secure.
The beginning of the end of this era of cryptography was foreseen by A. Kerckhoffs in the
following statement:
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the
key, is public knowledge.
A.Kerckhoffs, “La Cryptographie militaire”, 1883
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This was later reformulated by C. Shannon as “the enemy knows the system being used”[Sha49],
starting the modern era of cryptography, where security of cryptographic schemes or protocols
does no longer rely on the obscurity of the encryption methods. For cryptography this was the
paradigm shift from art to science.
Modern cryptography relies on the formulation of exact definitions for protocols and rigorous
proofs of security 1. Most noteably the security of most cryptographic protocols depends on the
unproven assumption that some mathematical problems, such as the factorisation of integers 2,
are hard to solve. A problem is computationally hard to solve if there exist no algorithms that
can do so in polynomial time. This of course means that these protocols are not indefinitely
secure since an adversary would be able to succeed in violating its security given enough time
or an algorithm that could solve the problem on which the protocol’s security relies efficiently.
Assumptions about the computational restriction of adversaries have so far proved to be suffi-
ciently strong for modern cryptography, but recent developments in quantum computing showed
the existence of an algorithm that can factorise integers in polynomial time if run on a quantum
computer, Shor’s algorithm [Sho94]. That means that once sufficiently large quantum comput-
ers are in use, the implemented cryptographic protocols will become vulnerable. Faced with
this increasingly real danger, cryptographers are trying to develop new approaches to achieve
security.
1.1.3 Quantum Cryptography
In the early 1970’s Wiesner proposed the idea of using two-state quantum-mechanical systems,
such as polarised photons, to encode and transmit messages [Wie83]. Motivated by Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle he showed that it is possible to use two “conjugate observables”, linear and
circular polarisation of photons, to “transmit two messages either but not both of which may
be received”. This important result remained unpublished for a decade, but set the basis of a
new form of cryptography that no longer relies on the computational limitation of an adversary
to achieve security. Quantum cryptography is solely based on the assumption that the laws of
quantum mechanics model nature accurately to achieve security.
Although the first steps of quantum cryptography passed almost unnoticed3 Brassard and Ben-
nett used Wiesner’s idea of “conjugate coding” to achieve something previously thought impos-
sible. The quantum key distribution protocol first developped by Bennett and Brassard and
later Ekert [BB84, Eke91, BBE92] that allows two users to exchange a secret key over a public
quantum communication channel that is eavesdropped on. The strength of this quantum pro-
tocol lies in the fact that the users are able to detect an eavesdropper who is trying to obtain
their key, since measuring a quantum state disturbs its original state.
Following this important success in quantum cryptography, the horizons of cryptography broad-
ened and the quest to implement more cryptographic tasks such as secure multi-party quantum
computation relying on quantum phenomena to achieve security began.
Finally it is important to mention post-quantum cryptography as another approach to face the
potential threat of quantum computers for the currently implemented cryptographic protocols.
1For a detailed introduction we refer to [KL07].
2Integer factorisation is a widely used computational hardness assumption in cryptographic protocols, for
example in RSA [RSA78]. So far there exists no algorithm that can solve the problem of factoring a large integer
into products of smaller number (usually primes) on a classical computer in polynomial time.
3For a very enjoyable brief account of these first steps refer to [Bra06].
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It is the field of search for classical cryptographic assumptions that cannot be broken efficiently
by quantum or classical computers [BBD09].
1.2 Secure Two-Party Computation
We have seen that for a long time cryptographers focused on the problem of transmitting secret
messages. One further problem of cryptography introduced by Yao in [Yao82] is that of secure
multi-party computation. That is the problem where a number of N players each of whom
holds an input x1, . . . , xN want to evaluate a function of all their inputs, f(x1, . . . , xN ) correctly
without disclosing information about their respective inputs. This is not only an interesting
cryptographic problem, but one that leads to a number of useful applications such as secret
voting, oblivious negotiation, private querying of database.
While Yao introduced the problem of secure multi-party computation, in [Yao82] he mainly
focused on the two-party case. That is the problem of two mutually distrustful parties correctly
computing a function without revealing their inputs to each other.
In this thesis we will focus on one problem of two-party computation, namely secure password-
based identification: A user Alice identifies herself to a server Bob by securely evaluating the
equality function on their inputs (or passwords). In the literature this is often refered to as
the “socialist millionaire problem”, a variant of the “millionaire problem”1, in which the two
millionaires want to determine if they are equally rich, without revealing any information about
their actual wealth to each other [Yao82].
1.2.1 Bit Commitment & Oblivious Transfer
In this section we focus on two similar but fundamental two-party computation problems, bit
commitment and oblivious transfer, their history and their importance.
Bit commitment schemes consist of two phases, the commit phase where the sender Alice chooses
the value of a bit and commits to it in the sense that it cannot be changed later and a reveal
phase during which the hidden value of the bit is revealed and before which the receiver Bob
has no information about the value of the bit.
Oblivious transfer is the transfer of information in such a way that the sender does not know what
information the receiver obtains. We will give a brief overview of its origin and its importance
in secure two-party computation.
The term was coined by Rabin in [Rab81], where he introduced what is now known as Rabin
OT, a protocol where one user Alice sends a message and another user Bob does or does not
receive it with equal probability, while Alice remains oblivious of the reception of the message,
this is often refered to as secure erasure channel.
A similar notion was introduced in the first paper on quantum cryptography “Conjugate Cod-
ing”, where Wiesner describes “a means for transmitting two messages, either but not both of
which may be received” [Wie83]. This was later rediscovered by Even, Goldreich and Lempel
1The millionaire or Yao’s millionaire problem is a classic secure multi-party computation problem in which
two millionaires want to determine who is richer without disclosing any information about their wealth to each
other.
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[EGL85] and named one-out-of-two oblivious transfer and denoted as
(
2
1
)−OT. Intuitively it can
be thought of as a black box in which a user Alice can store two messages and another user Bob
can choose to receive the first or second message but learns no further information about the
message he does not receive. Furthermore it fulfills the condition for oblivious transfer, namely
that Alice does not know which message Bob received.
A few years later, Cre´peau [Cre´88] proved that these two flavours of oblivious transfer are
equivalent. In the same year Kilian [Kil88] proved that the
(
2
1
)−OT primitive is complete for two-
party computation. This surprising result meant that a secure
(
2
1
)−OT construction is sufficient
to implement any two-party computation, making it a fundamental cryptographic problem.
Moreover from the results of [Kil88, Cre´88] a
(
2
1
)−OT protocol can be used to implement bit
commitment. Although a classical protocol was already introduced by Even, Goldreich and
Lempel [EGL85] it relies on computational assumptions that are insecure against a quantum
adversary. After the early success of quantum cryptography, research focused on the problem
of constructing unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes [BC91, BCJL93] and oblivious
transfer or
(
2
1
)−OT primitives [BBCS92, Cre´94].
Despite these first results, hope to achieve unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment
vanished as doing so was proved to be impossible in a quantum setting in [May96, LC97]. As
discussed above, since an
(
2
1
)−OT primitive can be used to implement bit commitment, the
impossiblity result for bit commitment implies that
(
2
1
)−OT is also impossible. In [Lo97], Lo
proved that all quantum one-sided two-party computations, including
(
2
1
)−OT are insecure.
Furthermore Colbeck in [Col07] and Buhrman et al. in [BCS12] showed that secure two-party
computation is impossible to achieve in a fully quantum setting.
One way to circumvent these impossibility results is to impose realistic restrictions on the users.
In the literature there are two successful models that do so, the bounded-quantum-storage
model[DFSS07, DFSS08] that upper bounds the size of quantum memory of the users and the
noisy-storage model[WST08, KWW12, Sch10] that assumes that the quantum memory used is
imperfect. Under the assumption of bounding the quantum storage of a user, unconditionally
secure oblivious transfer,
(
2
1
)−OT and thus two-party computation can be achieved [DFSS07,
DFSS08].
1.3 One-Time Memories In The Isolated Qubits Model
In 2013 Liu [Liu14a] suggested a further alternative to the memory-restricting models discussed
in the previous section, the isolated qubits model, where all parties are restricted to the use
of local operations on each qubit and classical communication(LOCC). The restriction to local
quantum operations on each qubit means that the users are not allowed to perform entangling
operations on the isolated qubits. The model is motivated by experimental work on nitrogen
vacancy centers in diamond that can be read out and manipulated optically while at the same
time it is difficult to perform entangling operations on pairs of such centers. We discuss the
isolated qubits model in more detail in Chapter 2.
A one-time memory (OTM) is a protocol or cryptographic device in which Alice stores two
messages and sends it to Bob, who is then able to retrieve only one of the two messages. In
essence it is a non-interactive or one-way
(
2
1
)−OT, but we will discuss their difference in more
detail in Section 2.4.2 Liu showed that it is possible to build an imperfect OTM in the IQM that
leaks a fraction of information about the unreceived message [Liu14a, Liu14b]. Furthermore,
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Liu recently showed that it is possible to use privacy amplification in order to achieve a secure
OTM for a single bit [Liu15].
A significant difference between the isolated qubits model and the noisy- and bounded-quantum-
storage models is that the parties are not forced to measure the qubits soon after reception,
rather they are allowed to store the qubits for an indefinite amount of time. This means that
the users are allowed to take advantage of any further information shared between them at a
later point to decide on their measurement strategy. On the other hand the noisy- and bounded-
quantum-storage models allow entangling operations between the users which is not allowed in
the isolated qubits model. In this sense the memory-restricting and isolated qubits models are
complementary, which is reflected in the fact that protocols that are secure in one model are not
secure in the other. Protocols in the noisy- or bounded-quantum-storage model are insecure in
the isolated qubits model in which the adversary has access to unlimited and perfect storage of
isolated qubits. The opposite is also true since the protocol presented in [Liu14b] is not secure
against an adversary that can perform entangling operations. We will discuss this in more detail
in Section 2.4.4.
1.4 Our Contributions
In this thesis, we study the constructions of “leaky” string and secure single-bit one-time memo-
ries in the isolated qubits model (IQM) introduced in [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15]. Using non-linear
degenerate functions [DFSS06] we simplify the proof presented in [Liu15]. We then construct and
prove the security of a string one-out-of-two sender-randomised oblivious transfer,
(
2
1
)−ROT,
protocol in this model.
Relying on the construction of a secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol we study for the first time
interactive protocols for more complex two-party functionalities in the IQM. In order to do so,
we assume that all parties measure the qubits they receive at the end of each sub-protocol, which
allows us to construct composed protocols. First, we construct a
(
2
1
)−OT protocol that makes
use of one instance of a
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality and prove its security. We then construct a weak
but efficient sender-randomised one-out-of-k oblivious transfer,
(
k
1
)−R˜OT, protocol. Finally, we
construct a protocol that implements the password-based identification functionality securely,
relying on a secure
(
k
1
)− R˜OT.
Moreover, we study the possibility to construct protocols that implement the password-based
identification functionality securely and non-interactively. We prove that such an implementa-
tion is impossible relying only on one-way transmission or even oblivious transfer of messages
and qubits from Alice to Bob.
1.5 Outline Of The Thesis
In Chapter 2, we introduce notation, the basic concepts from cryptography as well as the
model we use in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we extend bit one-time memories introduced in
[Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15] to string
(
2
1
)−ROTs using results from [DFSS06]. In Chapter 4, we study
more complex two-party functionalities that make use of multiple instances of the
(
2
1
)−ROTs
constructed in Chapter 3. Firstly, we construct a
(
2
1
)−OT protocol that makes use of one(
2
1
)−ROT functionality. Secondly, we study a (k1)−OT protocol presented in [BCR86] that
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makes use of k
(
2
1
)−OTs. Finally, we present a construction for a weaker but more efficient(
k
1
)− R˜OT protocol that uses only log k (21)−ROTs. In Chapter 5, we prove that constructing
a non-interactive identification protocol is impossible even using secure
(
k
1
)−OT functionalities.
We then propose a protocol to achieve secure password-based identification and prove its security
using the secure
(
k
1
)− R˜OT constructed in Chapter 4. In the last Chapter 6 we summarise our
results and discuss their significance.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce notation and the basic tools that we will use in this thesis.
We assume some familiarity with basic probability theory and quantum information theory. A
brief overview of the probability theory notions used in this thesis can be found in Appendix A
and for an indepth introduction to quantum information theory we refer the reader to [NC00].
2.1 Basic Notation
We use uppercase letters such as X,Y, Z to denote random variables, calligraphic letters X ,Y,Z
to denote sets and lowercase letters x, y, z to denote a specific value of a random variable.
Furthermore, for a sequence of random variables X1, . . . , Xk we write Xi, with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} to
denote the sequence X1, . . . , Xk excluding Xi.
Moreover, we introduce the symbol PX↔Y↔Z , as used in [DFSS07] and [FS09], to denote that
the distribution of a random variable X is independent of a random variable Z given a random
variable Y :
PX|Y Z = PX|Y , (2.1)
we then write:
PXY Z = PX↔Y↔Z . (2.2)
This notation is extended to PXY Z|E = PX↔Y↔Z|E to denote that the distribution of a random
variable X is independent of a random variable Z given a random variable Y conditioned on an
event E :
PX|Y ZE = PX|Y E . (2.3)
8
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Finally, the smoothed min-entropy of a random variable X conditioned on a random variable Y
is denoted by Hε∞(X|Y ). For more information we refer the reader to Appendix B.
For any matrix A ∈ Cm×n and vector x ∈ Cn we use ‖A‖, ‖A‖F and ‖A‖tr to denote the
operator, the Frobenius and the trace norm respectively. Further information on these norms
is included in Appendix C.
A brief overview of the Bachmann-Landau symbols:
We write f(k) = O(g(k)) if ∃c > 0, ∃k0, ∀k > k0 : |f(k)| ≤ c|g(k)|.
We write f(k) = o(g(k)) if ∀c > 0, ∃k0, ∀k > k0 : |f(k)| ≤ c|g(k)|.
We write f(k) = Ω(g(k)) if ∃c > 0, ∃k0, ∀k > k0 : |f(k)| ≥ c|g(k)|.
We write f(k) = Θ(g(k)) if ∃c1 > 0, ∃c2 > 0, ∃k0, ∀k > k0 : c1|g(k)| ≤ |f(k)| ≤ c2|g(k)|.
2.2 Functions
In this section we give a brief overview of special families of functions that we use in this thesis:
2.2.1 Non-Degenerate Linear Functions
Non-degenerate linear functions are functions that depend non-trivially on their inputs and are
defined in [DFSS06, Definition 4.2] as follows:
Definition 2.1. A function β : {0, 1}` × {0, 1}` 7→ {0, 1} is called a non-degenerate linear
function if it is of the form:
β : (s0, s1) 7→< u0, s0 > ⊕ < u1, s1 > (2.4)
for two non-zero strings u0, u1 ∈ {0, 1}`, where < ·, · > is the bit-wise inner product defined as:
< a, b >=
⊕`
i=1
ai · bi (2.5)
We further mention the definition of a more relaxed notion.
Definition 2.2. [DFSS06, Definition 4.3] A binary function β : {0, 1}` × {0, 1}` 7→ {0, 1}
is called 2-balanced if for any s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}` the functions β(s0, ·) and β(·, s1) are balanced,
meaning that |{σ1 ∈ {0, 1}` : β(s0, σ1) = 0| = 2`/2} and |{σ0 ∈ {0, 1}` : β(σ0, s1) = 0| = 2`/2}.
Finally we note the following result that will allow us to use the fact that for any string si the
functions β(si, ·) and β(·, si) are balanced in the proof of Lemma 3.6 in Section 3.2.1
Lemma 2.3. [DFSS06, Lemma 4.4] Every non-degenerate linear function is 2-balanced.
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2.2.2 t-wise Independent Hash Functions
We introduce the definition of t-wise independent hash functions as defined in [Liu15].
Definition 2.4. Let H be a family of functions h : {1, . . . , N} 7→ {1, . . . ,M} and H be a function
chosen uniformly at random from H. We call H a family of t-wise independent functions if for
all subsets S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} of size |S| ≤ t, where t ≥ 1 is an integer, the random variables
{H(x)|x ∈ S} are independent and uniformly distributed in {1, . . . ,M}.
Note that sampling and applying a random function from a family of t-wise independent hash
functions can be done efficiently ([Liu15, Proposition 2.5]).
We present a large-deviation bound for quadratic functions of 2t−wise independent random
variables [Liu15, Proposition 2.7]:
Proposition 2.5. Let t ≥ 2 be an even integer, and let H be a family of 2t-wise independent
functions {1, . . . , N} 7→ {0, 1}. Let A ∈ RN×N be a symmetric matrix, AT = A. Let H be a
function chosen uniformly at random from H, and define the random variable
S =
N∑
x,y=1
Axy
(
(−1)H(x) (−1)H(y) − δxy
)
, (2.6)
where δxy is the Kronecker δ that equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise.
Then the expected value of S is E[S] = 0 and we have the following large-deviation bound: for
any λ > 0,
P (|S| ≥ λ) ≤ 4e 16t√pit
(
4‖A˜‖2F t
eλ2
) t
2
+ 4e
1
12t
√
2pit
(
8‖A˜‖2t
eλ
)t
, (2.7)
where A˜ ∈ RN×N is the entry-wise absolute value of A, that is A˜xy = |Axy|.
2.3 Functionalities & Protocols
An ideal functionality formally describes a cryptographic task, detailing the behaviours of honest
and dishonest parties. A protocol is a series of clearly defined instructions that the (honest)
parties follow. Finally we define the security for a protocol, describing the conditions that need
to be fulfilled in order for a protocol to implement a functionality securely.
In this section, we introduce the ideal functionalities of
(
2
1
)−OT, (21)−ROT, (k1)−OT, (k1)−ROT,(
k
1
)− R˜OT and password-based identification as well as equivalent security definitions that we
will use in the following chapters.
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2.3.1
(
2
1
)−OT
First, we formally define the
(
2
1
)−OT functionality, that we discussed in Chapter 1, that allows
two parties to share one out of two messages such that the sender is oblivious as to which
message has been received, while the receiver has no knowledge of the second message.
Functionality 2.6. Upon receiving input messages A0, A1 ∈ X from Alice, where A =
{0, 1}l and the choice bit D ∈ {0, 1} from Bob, F(2
1
)−OT outputs AD to Bob and outputs
nothing to Alice.
Commonly security of a protocol is proven by showing that a real protocol is indistinguishable
from the ideal functionality. However there exists an alternative approach, [FS09, Proposi-
tion 4.3] allows us to use an equivalent security definition. If a protocol fulfills this definition,
then it securely implements the ideal functionality.
Definition 2.7. A ε−secure (21)−OT proocol is a protocol between Alice with inputs A0, A1 ∈ A
and Bob with input D ∈ {0, 1} such that the following holds:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, for any distribution of Alice’s
inputs A0, A1 ∈ A and Bob’s input D ∈ {0, 1}, Alice gets no output and Bob receives
output G = AD, except with probability ε.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G′, there exists a random vari-
able D′ ∈ {0, 1} such that:
PD′A0A1 ≈ε PD′ · PA0A1 (2.8)
and
PG′AD′D′A1−D′ ≈ε PG′|AD′D′ · PAD′D′A1−D′ (2.9)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V ′, there exists random variables
A′0, A′1 such that:
P [G = A′D] ≥ 1− ε, (2.10)
and
PDV ′A′0A′1 ≈ε PD · PV ′A′0A′1 (2.11)
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2.3.2
(
2
1
)−ROT
While
(
2
1
)−OT is a powerful tool we present a different oblivious transfer functionality, the
randomised one-out-of-two oblivious transfer
(
2
1
)−ROT. Contrary to the (21)−OT Alice does
not input two messages but receives two random messages from the functionality while Bob
receives one out of the two messages depending on his input choice. We present the formal
definition of the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality.
Functionality 2.8. Upon receiving no input from Alice and the choice bit D ∈ {0, 1} from
Bob, F(2
1
)−ROT outputs messages A0, A1 ∈ A, where A = {0, 1}` to Alice and message AD
to Bob.
Furthermore, we introduce an equivalent security definition that protocols that securely imple-
ment the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality should fulfill.
Definition 2.9. A ε−secure (21)−ROT proocol is a protocol between Alice with no input and
Bob with input D ∈ {0, 1} such that the following holds:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, for any distribution of Bob’s input
D ∈ {0, 1}, Alice receives output A0, A1 ∈ A and and Bob receives output G = AD, except
with probability ε.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G, there exists a random vari-
able D′ ∈ {0, 1} such that:
PA1−D′GAD′D′ ≈ε PU · PGAD′D′ (2.12)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V ′, there exists random variables
A′0, A′1 such that:
P [G = A′D] ≥ 1− ε, (2.13)
and
PDV ′A′0A′1 ≈ε PD · PV ′A′0A′1 (2.14)
2.3.3
(
k
1
)−OT
In this section, we focus on a generalised oblivious transfer functionality that takes k inputs
instead of two, the 1-out-of-k Oblivious Transfer, denoted as
(
k
1
)−OT. It is a two-party func-
tionality between a user Alice that inputs k messages X1, X2, . . . , Xk and a user Bob who is
allowed to retrieve only one of these messages XD according to his choice D. When the above
functionality is implemented securely, Bob should not be able to learn additional information
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on any of the other messages. At the same time, the obliviousness of the protocol must still
hold, Alice should not have any knowledge about the choice of Bob.
The formal definition of the
(
k
1
)−OT functionality is the following:
Functionality 2.10. Upon receiving input messages X1, . . . , Xk ∈ X from Alice, where
X = {0, 1}l and the choice D ∈ {1, . . . , k} of Bob, F(k
1
)−OT outputs XD to Bob and outputs
nothing to Alice.
We now introduce an equivalent security definition for the
(
k
1
)−OT functionality.
Definition 2.11. A ε−secure (k1)−OT proocol is a protocol between Alice with inputs X1, . . . , Xk ∈
X and Bob with input D ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that the following holds:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, for any distribution of Alice’s
inputs X1, . . . , Xk ∈ X and Bob’s input D ∈ {1, . . . , k}, Alice gets no output and Bob
receives output G = XD, except with probability ε.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G′, there exists a random vari-
able D′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that:
PD′X1...Xk ≈ε PD′ · PX1...Xk (2.15)
and
PG′XD′D′XD′
≈ε PG′|XD′D′ · PXD′D′XD′ (2.16)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V ′, there exist random variables
X ′1, . . . X ′k such that:
P [G = X ′D] ≥ 1− ε, (2.17)
and
PDV ′X′1...X′k ≈ε PD · PV ′X′1...X′k (2.18)
2.3.4
(
k
1
)−ROT
In this section we introduce a slightly different flavour of the
(
k
1
)−OT, where the user Alice
does not input messages X1, . . . , Xk but instead has no inputs and receives as ouptut k random
messages S1, . . . , Sk. This functionality is defined formally below:
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Functionality 2.12. Honestly behaving Alice and Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice
and a choice D ∈ {1, . . . , k} from Bob, F(k
1
)−ROT samples random independent strings
S1, . . . , Sk ∈ S = {0, 1}` and sends S1, . . . , Sk to Alice and SD to Bob.
Honest Alice and dishonest Bob: Upon receiving no input from Alice, a choice D ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and a string SD ∈ S from Bob, F(k
1
)−ROT samples random independent strings SD ∈ S, and
sends S1, . . . , Sk to Alice.
Dishonest Alice and honest Bob: Upon receiving input messages S1, . . . , Sk ∈ S from Alice,
where S and the choice D ∈ {1, . . . , k} of Bob, F(k
1
)−ROT outputs SD to Bob and outputs
nothing to Alice.
We introduce the security definition for the
(
k
1
)−ROT functionality.
Definition 2.13. The sender-randomised
(
k
1
)−ROT is secure if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, for any distribution of Bob’s input
D, Alice gets outputs S1, . . . , Sk ∈ S uniform and independent of D and Bob receives
output SD, except with probability ε.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G′, there exists a random vari-
able D′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that:
PSD′SD′D′G′
≈ε PUk−1 · PSD′D′G′ (2.19)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V ′, there exist random variables
S′1, . . . , S′k such that:
P [G = S′D] ≥ 1− ε, (2.20)
and
PDV ′S′1,...,S′k ≈ε PD · PV ′S′1,...,S′k (2.21)
Finally we introduce the security definition for a slightly weaker
(
k
1
)−ROT functionality that
we call
(
k
1
)− R˜OT.
Definition 2.14. The sender-randomised
(
k
1
)− R˜OT is ε−secure if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob, for any distribution of Bob’s input
D, Alice gets outputs S1, . . . , Sk ∈ S uniform and independent of D and Bob receives
output SD, except with probability ε.
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Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G′, there exists a random vari-
able D′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that for all I 6= D′:
PSISD′D′G′ ≈ε PU · PSD′D′G′ (2.22)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V , there exist random variables
S′1, . . . , S′k such that:
P [G = S′D] ≥ 1− ε, (2.23)
and
PDV ′S′1,...,S′k ≈ε PD · PV ′S′1,...,S′k (2.24)
The
(
k
1
)− R˜OT is weaker since although every message that does not correspond to Bob’s input
remains hidden, this is not true for all messages simultaneously. While weaker, the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT
functionality is strong enough to construct a secure password-based identification protocol as
we will show in Chapter 5. Furthermore the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT protocol we present in Chapter 4 is
more efficient than the
(
k
1
)−ROT and (k1)−OT protocols, as it makes use of log k instead of k(
2
1
)−OTs.
2.3.5 Password-Based Identification
We define the functionality of identification, where a user Alice identifies herself to a server Bob
by securely evaluating the equality function on their inputs, called passwords. Our definition is
motivated by [FS09].
Functionality 2.15. Upon receiving strings WA ∈ W from user Alice, where W :=
{1, . . . , k}, and WB ∈ W from server Bob, FID outputs the bit G = WA ?= WB to Bob.
In case Alice is dishonest she may choose WA =⊥ (which never agrees with honest Bob’s
input) and (for any choice of WA) the bit G is also output to Alice .
The idea behind the FID functionality is that Alice and Bob both have an input string WA and
WB respectively to act as a password and Bob receives and outputs a bit corresponding to the
acceptance of Alice’s password if their chosen inputs are the same or the rejection if their inputs
are not equal. In order for a protocol that fulfills the FID functionality to be secure, a dishonest
server should not be able to learn Alice’s password, except with the probability that he guesses
the password correctly. At the same time it has to be secure against a dishonest user Alice, so
that Bob will not accept her password if it does not correspond to his choice WB. We introduce
the definition that should be fulfilled by secure password-based identification protocols.
Definition 2.16. A password-based identification protocol is ε−secure if the following conditions
are fulfilled:
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Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest server Bob with inputs WA = WB, Bob outputs
G = 1 except with probability ε.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest server Bob with output G′, for any distribution of WA,
there exists a random variable W ′ that is independent of WA such that :
PWAW ′G′|W ′ 6=WA ≈ε PWA↔W ′↔G′|W ′ 6=WA . (2.25)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice with output V ′, for any distribution of WB,
there exists a random variable W ′ independent of WB such that if W ′ 6= WB then P [G =
1] ≤ ε and :
PWBW ′V ′|W ′ 6=WB ≈ε PWB↔W ′↔V ′|W ′ 6=WB . (2.26)
2.4 One-Time Memories In The Isolated Qubits Model
2.4.1 The Isolated Qubits Model
In Chapter 1, we gave a brief introduction of the isolated qubits model that was first presented
by Liu in [Liu14a]. In more detail, parties in this model are restricted to local quantum oper-
ations on each qubit and classical communication between the qubits. As detailed in [Liu14a]
any local operation and classical communication (LOCC) strategy, in the sense desribed above,
can be described by a series of adaptive single-qubit measurements. In subsequent work, Liu de-
scribes how to model any LOCC adversary by a separable positive-operator-value measurement
(POVM) [Liu14b].
Furthermore, in contrast with the memory-restricting models described in Chapter 1, in the
isolated qubits model, all parties are allowed to store qubits for a long time and are not allowed to
perform entangling operations between qubits. While the restriction on entanglement operations
reduces the power of an adversary, the possibility to store qubits for a long time has some
important implications. An adversary is thus allowed to store qubits and measure them at the
end of a protocol, making use of any information he receives to decide on his measurement
strategy. Thus usual privacy amplification techniques using hash functions are not effective,
which necessitates the use of stronger families of hash functions and a different approach on
using them, as described in [Liu15]. We will describe this in more detail in Section 2.4.3.
Moreover the ability of storing qubits for a long time allows an adversary to measure the qubits
received at the end of the composed protocol1.
It is then not clear if the sub-protocols remains secure. Composability in the isolated qubits
model has not been studied and it seems to be a non-trivial problem.
1In cryptography, it is common usage to make calls to secure functionalities in a protocol. For example one
could use a series of n single-bit commitment functionalities to commit to an n−bit string. One then argues that
since every single bit is commited securely, the same holds for the concatenation of these bits. Composability of
protocols allows one to use a modular design to construct and prove the security of complex protocols.
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In this thesis we assume that all parties have to measure all qubits used in a sub-protocol at
the latest at the end of this sub-protocol. This rather strong assumption allows us to construct
composed protocols that make calls to functionalities as sub-routines.
2.4.2 Leaky String
(
2
1
)−ROT
In this section, we introduce a protocol for imperfect
(
2
1
)−ROT motivated by the “leaky” one-
time memory (OTM) construction presented in [Liu14b].
The security definitions for the “leaky” and perfect OTMs presented in [Liu14b, Liu15] are
similar to the
(
2
1
)−ROT security definition, introduced earlier in this chapter. In Chapter 3 we
use the “leaky”
(
2
1
)−ROT presented here to construct protocols a secure string (21)−ROT. We
then use the latter in Chapter 4 to construct a secure
(
2
1
)−OT protocol.
For consistency with the view of cryptographic tasks as functionalities that are implemented by
protocols we do not use the notion of one-time memories as devices that store two messages out
of which only one can be read. We instead construct protocols that implement the
(
2
1
)−ROT
functionality (Functionality 2.8) between two users, Alice and Bob. The main difference between
an OTM and an oblivious transfer protocol is the fact that the first is non-interactive in the sense
that only Alice sends information to Bob, while an oblivious transfer protocol is not necessarily
non-interactive. In that sense, the latter is weaker since an OTM implements the oblivious
transfer functionality, but an interactive oblivious transfer protocol does not implement the
OTM functionality.
We first rewrite the “leaky” OTM as introduced in [Liu14b] as a non-interactive “leaky”(
2
1
)−ROT protocol that takes no input from Alice and input D from Bob, and outputs s and t
to Alice and one of the two messages to Bob depending on his input choice. This protocol leaks
some information about both messages to Bob and is thus not secure.
Protocol 2.17. A protocol for “leaky” string
(
2
1
)−ROT between users Alice with no input and
and Bob with input D ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
Let C ′ : {0, 1}` 7→ {0, 1}n log q be an error correcting code that is linear in GF (2) and approaches
the capacity of a q-ary symmetric channel Eq with error probability pe = 12 − 12q .
1. Alice samples and receives as output two strings s, t ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly at random.
2. Alice computes C ′(s) and C ′(t) and views them as n blocks of log q qubits.
3. Alice prepares the qubits in the following way and sends them to Bob:
For i = 1, . . . , n:
(a) Let γi ∈ {0, 1} be the outcome of an independent and fair coin toss.
(b) If γi = 0 then prepare the i
th block of log q qubits of the codeword C ′(s) in the
computational basis: |C ′(s)i〉
(c) If γi = 1 then prepare the i
th block of log q qubits of the codeword C ′(t) in the com-
putational basis: H⊗ log q|C ′(t)i〉
4. Bob measures every qubit in the base corresponding to his input D ∈ {0, 1} in the following
way:
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• If D = 0, he measures all the qubits he receives in the computational basis.
• If D = 1, he measures all the qubits he receives in the Hadamard basis.
5. Bob runs the decoding algorithm for C ′ on the string of measurement outcomes z ∈
{0, 1}n log q and receives s or t depending on his choice D.
We present the definitions for separable measurements and δ-non-negligible measurement out-
comes as presented in [Liu14b], that are used in Theorem 2.19 and later in Chapter 3.
Separable Measurement A measurement on m qubits is called separable if it can be written
in the form E : ρ 7→ ∑iK†i ρKi, where each operator Ki is a tensor product of m single-qubit
operators Ki = Ki,1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Ki,m
δ-non-negligible Measurement Outcome
Definition 2.18. For any quantum state ρ ∈ Cd×d, and any δ > 0, we say that a measurement
outcome (POVM element) M ∈ Cd×d is δ-non-negligible if tr(Mρ) ≥ δ · tr(M)/d.
We rephrase the main result of the original paper, [Liu14b, Theorem 2.3], that defines the
security of the protocol:
Theorem 2.19 (“Leaky” String
(
2
1
)−ROT). For any k ≥ 2, and for any small constant 0 <
µ << 1, Protocol 2.17 between Alice with no input and Bob with input D ∈ {0, 1}, has the
following properties:
1. Correctness: For honest users Alice and Bob, Alice receives two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}`,
where ` = Θ(k2) and Bob receives either s or t depending on his choice D, using only
LOCC operations.
2. “Leaky” security: Let δ0 > 0 be any constant, and set δ = 2
−δ0k. Honest user Alice receives
outputs s, t ∈ {0, 1}`. For any dishonest LOCC Bob, and any separable measurement
outcome M that is δ-non-neglibible, we have the following security bound:
Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥
(
1
2
− µ
)
`− δ0k. (2.27)
Here S and T are the random variables describing the two messages, Z is the random
variable representing the Bob’s measurement outcome, and we have ε ≤ e−Ω(k).
The proof of this theorem can be found in [Liu14b]. This
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol leaks a constant
fraction of information to Bob and is thus not secure for cryptographic tasks.
2.4.3 Privacy Amplification
Common privacy amplification techniques rely on applying a function with a random seed to the
string the user holds and require the users to share their seed at a later point. These techniques
cannot be used in the isolated qubits model as a dishonest user can postpone his measurement
until he has knowledge of the seed and use that information to adapt his measurement.
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 19
Liu introduces a privacy amplification technique that can be used in the isolated qubits model
in [Liu15]. The technique relies on the use of a fixed hash function of a family of r-wise hash
functions, that is a family of stronger hash functions than the ones described above. This method
allows privacy amplification on the output of a leaky string OTM as the ones presented in
[Liu14a, Liu14b] and leads to the construction of a secure single-bit OTM [Liu15]. In Chapter 3
we follow a similar approach to achieve secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT, instead of the single-bit OTM
presented in [Liu15].
2.4.4 Comparing The Isolated Qubits And Bounded Quantum Storage Mod-
els
In Section 1.3 we mentioned briefly that the OTM protocols studied in [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15]
are not necessarily secure in the noisy- and bounded-quantum-storage models and that at the
same time protocols that rely on a quantum memory bound to achieve security are not guaran-
teed to be secure in the isolated qubits model.
In more detail, the OTM protocols constructed in the isolated qubits model are insecure in
a model where entangling operations are allowed. An attack against the OTM protocols by
an adversary who is allowed to pefrorm entangling operations has been sketched in [Liu14b],
relying on the gentle measurement lemma [Win99] and running the decoding alrgorithm for the
error-correcting code on a superposition of many different inputs. This implies that the OTM
and
(
2
1
)−ROT protocols described in [Liu14a, Liu14b, Liu15] and this thesis are not secure in
the noisy- and bounded-quantum-storage models.
On the other hand protocols in the noisy- and bounded-quantum-storage model [WST08,
KWW12, Sch10], rely on the memory bound or imperfect storage in order to achieve security.
In protocols such as Protocol 5.1, one user encodes qubits in the computational or Hadamard
basis while the receiver measures the qubits either in a random basis or in a sequence of bases
depending on his input. Since these measurements are destructive, the users commit to a par-
ticular choice of measurement bases. The correct sequence of bases is announced between the
users at a later point, after the memory-bound has been applied. This step allows the users
to know which qubits they have measured in the same basis and thus have obtained the same
result, unless the quantum communication channel is being eavesdropped on. At the same time
the step of announcing the bases used to encode the sent qubits can be exploited by a malicious
user in the isolated qubits model. Since the users are allowed to store the received qubits for
an indefinite amount of time after receiving the qubits, an adversary is allowed to wait until
he has received the sequence of bases and thus measure all qubits correctly, which violates the
security of these protocols.
Thus we argue that protocols that rely on the restriction of a user to perform non-entangling
operations cannot be secure in the memory restricting models. On the other hand protocols
that rely on the inability of an adversary to store qubits noiselessly or in large numbers cannot
be secure in the isolated qubits model.
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In this chapter, we introduce a
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol in the isolated qubits model (IQM), motivated
by the “ideal” OTM presented in [Liu15]. Our protocol takes no input from Alice and one bit
D as Bob’s input, and outputs two strings A0 and A1 to Alice and one string AD to Bob.
This protocol first uses the “leaky”
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol presented in Chapter 2 and makes use
of the privacy amplification technique introduced in [Liu15] to achieve security. The
(
2
1
)−ROT
protocol differs from the “ideal” OTM of [Liu15] in the fact that the messages are strings instead
of single bits as in the original. To prove the security of the
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol we use some
results presented in [DFSS06] that allow us to simplify and extend the proof to longer messages,
a technique that was not used in the original.
3.1 Secure String
(
2
1
)−ROT
As discussed in the previous chapter, the “leaky”
(
2
1
)−ROT, Protocol 2.17, is not secure be-
cause it leaks some information. Commonly in such a case one would use privacy amplification
techniques to achieve security from this less secure protocol. Typically this involves applying
a hash function with a seed that is picked by Alice and later announced to Bob, after he has
measured the received qubits or messages.
In the isolated qubits model however, the use of such techniques is not possible since Bob is
allowed to wait and measure the qubits at a later point, in this case after learning the seed
of the hash function used for privacy ampification. A privacy amplification technique such as
this would at best have no effect or even allow a dishonest user Bob to use that information
to attack the protocol. In [Liu15], Liu presented a technique for privacy amplification in the
isolated qubits model by fixing two r-wise independent hash functions at the beginning of the
protocol, and applying them on the outputs of the “leaky”
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol.
3.1.1 Protocol String
(
2
1
)−ROT
We introduce a protocol for string
(
2
1
)−ROT based on the protocol proposed by Liu [Liu14b]
and the privacy amplification technique that uses two fixed r-wise independent hash functions.
20
Chapter 3.
(
2
1
)−ROT In The Isolated Qubits Model 21
Protocol 3.1. A protocol for string
(
2
1
)−ROT between user Alice with no input and Bob with
input D ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Alice chooses two r-wise independent hash functions F and G uniformly at random.
2. Alice with no input and Bob with input D use a “leaky” string
(
2
1
)−ROT (such as Proto-
col 2.17). Alice receives as output two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}` and Bob, depending on his
choice, receives s if D = 0 or t if D = 1.
3. Alice receives output A0, A1 ∈ {0, 1}`′ such that:
A0 = F (s) (3.1)
A1 = G(t) (3.2)
4. Bob computes F (s) or G(t), depending on his input D and obtains AD.
3.1.2 Security Of The Protocol
It is not difficult to see that if the “leaky” string
(
2
1
)−ROT is correct then Protocol 3.1 is correct.
Furthermore since the protocol is non-interactive Alice learns nothing about Bob’s actions, as
is reasoned in [Liu15].
The security for Alice of an
(
2
1
)−ROT, Definition 2.9, is equivalent to the following definition,
that was used in [Liu15]:
Definition 3.2. We say that Protocol 3.1 is secure if the following holds: Let k ≥ 1 be a
security parameter. Suppose Alice receives as output two messages A0, A1 ∈ {0, 1}. Consider
any dishonest LOCC user Bob, and let Z be the random variable representing the results of
Bob’s measurements. Then there exists a random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that:
‖PA1−DADDZ − PU`′ × PADDZ‖1 ≤ 2−Ω(k), (3.3)
where U `
′
denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1}`′.
Theorem 3.3 then states that we can reduce a secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol (Protocol 3.1)
to a “leaky” string
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol (Protocol 2.17). That is if there exists a protocol with
output two strings s, t ∈ {0, 1}` and leaking any constant fraction of information of s and t,
then we can construct a
(
2
1
)−ROT where Alice receives two strings A0, A1 ∈ {0, 1}`′ and only
allows an exponentially small amount of information about either A0 or A1 to leak, and is thus
secure.
Theorem 3.3. For any constants θ ≥ 1, δ0 > 0, α > 0, ε0 > 0 and 0 < κ < min
{
δ0
2 ,
ε0
2 ,
α
4
}
there exists a constant k0 ≥ 1 such that:
Suppose we have a “leaky”
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol in the isolated qubits model, such as Protocol 2.17,
indexed by a security parameter k ≥ k0. More precisely, suppose that for all k ≥ k0,
1. Alice receives as output from Protocol 2.17 two messages s, t ∈ {0, 1}`, where ` ≥ k and
uses m qubits, where k ≤ m ≤ kθ.
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2. Correctness: For honest users, Alice receives s and t and Bob receives s if D = 0 or t if
D = 1, using only LOCC operations.
3. “Leaky” security: Let δ0 > 0 be any constant, and set δ = 2
−δ0k. Honest user Alice
receives outputs s, t ∈ {0, 1}`. For any dishonest LOCC Bob, let Z be the random variable
representing the result of his measurement. Let M be any separable measurement outcome
M that is δ-non-neglibible. Then:
Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥ αk, (3.4)
where ε ≤ 2−ε0k.
Now assumbe Alice and Bob use Protocol 3.1, with r-wise independent hash functions F,G :
{0, 1}` 7→ {0, 1}`′, with
r = 4(γ + 1)k2θ (3.5)
and
`′ = κk. (3.6)
This choice of r is motivated by the union bound, see equation (3.52). Here γ is some universal
constant. The choice of `′ is motivated by equations (3.99), (3.100), (3.101) and (3.102)
Then Protocol 3.1 is a secure
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol in the isolated qubits model, in the sense
of Definition 3.2. More precisely, for all k ≥ k0, the following statements hold, except with
probability e−Ω(k2θ) over the choice of F and G:
1. Alice receives as output from Protocol 3.1 two messages A0, A1 ∈ {0, 1}`′ and uses m
qubits, where k ≤ m ≤ kθ.
2. Correctness: Correctness: For honest users Alice with no input and Bob with input D,
Alice receives A0 and A1 and Bob receives AD, using only LOCC operations.
3. “Ideal” security: For honest Alice with outputs (A0, A1) from Protocol 3.1, for any dis-
honest LOCC user Bob, let Z be the random variable representing the results of his mea-
surements. Then there exists a random variable D ∈ {0, 1}, such that:
‖PA1−DADDZ − PU × PADDZ‖1
≤ 2−(δ0k−2(`′+1)) + 2−(ε0k−2`′+3) + 2−(α2 k−2(`′+1)) + 2−(α2 k−2(`′+2+θ ln k)−ln (γ+1))
≤ 2−Ω(k),
(3.7)
Before proving this theorem we present the definition of the ε′−obliviousness condition in order
to introduce Theorem 3.5 that we use later to prove the security of Protocol 3.1.
Note that the ε′−obliviousness condition (for Random 1-2 OT`) extended for strings [DFSS06,
Definition 3.2] describes the security condition of Definition 3.2.
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Definition 3.4. ε′-Obliviousness condition: For any LOCC adversary who observes the
measurement outcome Z, there exists a binary random variable D such that
‖PA1−D AD DZ − PU` × PAD DZ‖ ≤ ε′ (3.8)
Moreover, we introduce [DFSS06, Theorem 4.5], that we will use to prove the security of Pro-
tocol 3.1.
Theorem 3.5. [DFSS06, Theorem 4.5] The ε′-obliviousness condition is satisfied for any LOCC
adversary who observes the measurement outcome Z if and only if:
∀ non-degenerate linear function β:‖Pβ(A0,A1)Z − PU`′ × PZ‖ ≤
ε′
22`′+1
(3.9)
Theorem 3.5 states that it is enough to show that ‖P(β(A0,A1))Z − P `
′
U × PZ‖ ≤ ε
′
22`′+1
for all
non-degenerate linear functions β, in order to prove the security of the protocol.
3.2 Proof Of Theorem 3.3
In this section we prove Theorem 3.3 following the reasoning used in [Liu15]. We first show that
with high probability over F and G the scheme is secure for any fixed separable measurement
outcome M . Then we use the µ−net W˜ for the set of all separable measurement outcomes and
show that Protocol 3.1 is secure at all points M˜ ∈ W˜ with high probability.We then show that
any separable measurement M can be approximated by a measurement outcome in the µ−net,
M˜ ∈ W˜ . Then security at M˜ implies security at M for any separable measurement. Thus
Protocol 3.1 is secure.
3.2.1 Security For Fixed Measurement M
First, we show that in the case when the adversary observes a fixed measurement outcome
Z = M the protocol is secure. Assuming that M is separable and δ−non-negligible, the “leaky”
security guarantee implies Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥ αk (equation (3.4)). The following lemma
defines a smoothing event E and the quantity Rβ(M) and states that Rβ(M) is small, with high
probability over the choice of F and G.
Lemma 3.6. Fix any measurement outcome M such that Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥ αk. Then there
exists an event E, occurring with probability P (E|Z = M) ≥ 1 − ε, such that the following
statement holds for all non-degenerate linear functions β : {0, 1}`′ × {0, 1}`′ 7→ {0, 1}:
We define:
Rβ(M) = E(1E · (−1)β(A0,A1) |Z = M), (3.10)
which is a random variable depending on F , G, S and T , since A0 = F (S) and A1 = G(T ).
Then for all λ > 0 and for all non-degenerate linear functions β,
PF,G;S, T (|Rβ(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 8e1/(3r)
√
pir
(
8 · 2−αkr2
e2λ2
)r/4
. (3.11)
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Proof. From Hε∞(S, T |Z = M) ≥ αk, there exists a smoothing event E , occurring with proba-
bility P (E |Z = M) ≥ 1− ε, such that:
∀ s, t ∈ {0, 1}`, P (E , S = s, T = t|Z = M) ≤ 2−αk. (3.12)
Then the following holds:
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)2
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M) · P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)
≤
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
2−αk · P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)
= 2−αk ·
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)
≤ 2−αk
(3.13)
We now bound the quantity Rβ(M) in a similar way as in [Liu15]. For a non-degenerate linear
function β defined by non-zero strings u0, u1, β(A0, A1) =< u0, F (s) > + < u1, G(t) >, where
by definition A0 = F (s) and A1 = G(t). We then rewrite R
β(M) as
Rβ(M) =
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
(−1)<u0,F (s)>+<u1,G(t)>P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M). (3.14)
Firstly, we define a function H : {0, 1} × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}:
H(i, s) =
{
< u0, F (s) >, if i = 0
< u1, G(s) >, if i = 1,
(3.15)
for two non-zero u0, u1 ∈ {0, 1}`′ .
Note that since F,G are r−wise independent hash functions and u0, u1 are non-zero strings then
< u0, F (s) > and < u1, G(s) > are also r−wise independent hash functions.
By definition, F is a r−wise independent hash function if for all subsets S ⊂ {0, 1}` of size |S| ≤
r, the random variables {F (x)|x ∈ S} are independent and uniformly distributed in {0, 1}`′ .
Then the random variables {< u0, F (x) > |x ∈ S} are also independent, where < u0, F (x) >=⊕`′
i=1u0i · {F (x)}i. Furthermore, from the fact that all non-degenerate linear functions are
2−balanced, Lemma 2.3, and from the definition of 2−balanced functions, Definition 2.2, we
can see that since u0 is non-zero the random variables {< u0, F (x) > |x ∈ S} are uniformly
distributed. (The same holds for {< u1, G(x) > | x ∈ S}).
Chapter 3.
(
2
1
)−ROT In The Isolated Qubits Model 25
Secondly, we define a matrix A ∈ R(2·2`)×(2·2`) with entries A(i,s)(j,t), for i, j ∈ {0, 1} and
s, t ∈ {0, 1}`, that take the values:
A(i,s),(j,t) =

1
2P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M) if (i, j) = (0, 1)
1
2P (E , S = t, T = s |Z = M) if (i, j) = (1, 0)
0 otherwise.
(3.16)
Finally, using equation (3.15) and equation (3.16), Rβ(M) can be written in the following way,
Rβ(M) = E(1E · (−1)β(A0,A1) |Z = M) (3.17)
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)(−1)<u0,F (s)>+<u1,G(t)> (3.18)
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
{
1
2P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)(−1)<u0,F (s)>+<u1,G(t)> (3.19)
+ 12P (E , S = t, T = s |Z = M)(−1)<u1,G(t)>+<u0,F (s)>
}
(3.20)
=
∑
(i,s),(j,t)
A(i,s),(j,t)
(
(−1)H(i,s)(−1)H(j,t) − δ(i,s),(j,t)
)
(3.21)
Since < u0, F > and < u1, G > are r-wise independent random functions, we can set t = r/2
and use Proposition 2.5, using the following bounds on A˜:
‖A˜‖2 ≤ ‖A˜‖2F =
∑
(i,s),(j,t)
A2(i,s),(j,t)
= 12
∑
s,t
P (E , S = s, T = t |Z = M)2
≤ 12 · 2−αk,
(3.22)
where in the last line we used equation (3.13). Then by substituting into Proposition 2.5 we
prove equation (3.11). We thus prove Lemma 3.6.
Next, we introduce Lemma 3.7 that implies that if Rβ(M) is small, we can use Theorem 3.5 to
prove the security of the protocol when the adversary observes the measurement outcome M .
Lemma 3.7. Fix any measurement outcome M . Suppose |Rβ(M)| ≤ ξ. Then:
‖Pβ(A0,A1),E|Z=M − PU‖ ≤ ξ + ε (3.23)
Proof. Fix a measurement outcome M and suppose |Rβ(M)| ≤ ξ. From the definition of Rβ(M)
we have that:
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Rβ(M) = E(1E · (−1)β(A0,A1) |Z = M) (3.24)
= P (β(A0, A1) = 0, E|Z = M)− P (β(A0, A1) = 1, E|Z = M) (3.25)
From Rβ(M) ≤ ξ :
−ξ ≤ P (β(A0, A1) = 0, E|Z = M)− P (β(A0, A1) = 1, E|Z = M) ≤ ξ (3.26)
From P (E|Z = M) ≥ 1− ε and basic probability theory:
1− ε ≤ P (E|Z = M) =P (β(A0, A1) = 0, E|Z = M) + P (β(A0, A1) = 1, E|Z = M) ≤ 1 (3.27)
Combining equation (3.26) with equation (3.27) we get:
∣∣∣∣P (β(A0, A1) = 0, E|Z = M)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ + ε2 (3.28)
and
∣∣∣∣P (β(A0, A1) = 1, E|Z = M)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ + ε2 (3.29)
Then the `1 distance between Pβ(A0,A1),E|Z=M and PU is:
‖Pβ(A0,A1),E|Z=M − PU‖ =
∣∣∣∣P (β(A0, A1) = 0, E|Z = M)− 12
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣P (β(A0, A1) = 1, E|Z = M)− 12
∣∣∣∣
≤ ξ + ε
(3.30)
Thus we have proven that if Rβ(M) is small, Lemma 3.7 together with Theorem 3.5 imply that
Protocol 3.1 is secure againsta dishonest user Bob that observes the measurement outcome M .
3.2.2 Security For µ−net
In [Liu15], it is shown that there exists an µ−net W˜ for the set of all possible separable mea-
surement outcomes W with respect to the operator norm ‖ · ‖. In this section, we show that
the protocol is secure for all the measurement outcomes in the µ−net.
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First, we introduce the following lemma as presented and proved in [Liu15].
Lemma 3.8. [Liu15, Lemma 3.5] For any 0 < µ ≤ 1, there exists a set W˜ ⊂W , of cardinality
|W˜ | ≤
(
9m
µ
)4m
, which is a µ−net for W with respect to the operator norm ‖ · ‖.
We then use Lemma 3.8, and set
µ = 2−(α/2)k · δ
2
4m
, (3.31)
The value of µ is chosen so that it is small enough to approximate any measurement outcome,
see equation (3.88) in the next section.
Together with the fact that k ≤ m ≤ kθ and δ = 2−δ0k the cardinality of W˜ is bounded by:
|W˜ | ≤
(
9m · 2α2 k 4
m
δ2
)4m
=
(
2log(9m)+
α
2
k+2δ0k+2m
)4m
(3.32)
= 24m log(9m)+4(α/2+2δ0)km+8m
2 ≤ 24m log(9m)+(2α+8δ0+8)m2 ≤ 24kθ log(9kθ)+(2α+8δ0+8)k2θ
(3.33)
= 24k
θ log 9+4kθθ log k+(2α+8δ0+8)k2θ . (3.34)
For sufficiently large k it holds that log k ≤ k ≤ kθ ≤ k2θ. This also implies that kθ log k ≤ k2θ.
Then for all sufficiently large k,
|W˜ | ≤ 24kθ log 9+4kθθ log k+(2α+8δ0+8)k2θ ≤ 2(4 log 9+4θ+2α+8δ0+8)k2θ (3.35)
≤ 2γk2θ , (3.36)
where γ is a constant.
Next we use Lemma 3.6 and we set
λ = 2−(α/2)k · 2r. (3.37)
Then we have that
PF,G;S, T (|Rβ(M)| ≥ λ) ≤ 8e1/3r
√
pir(e2/2)−r/4. (3.38)
Finally, using the union bound we show that with high probability for all M˜ ∈ W˜ and all
non-degenerate linear functions β, Rβ(M˜) is small.
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PF,G;S, T
(
∃M˜ ∈ W˜ , s.t. M˜ is δ-non-negligible, and ∃β s.t. |Rβ(M˜)| ≥ λ
)
(3.39)
≤ |W˜ | ·
∑
β
PF,G;S, T (|Rβ(M˜)| ≥ λ) (3.40)
≤ |W˜ | · 22`′ · PF,G;S, T (|Rβ(M˜)| ≥ λ) (3.41)
≤ 2γk2θ · 22`′ ·
(
8e1/(3r)
√
pir(e2/2)−r/4
)
(3.42)
r=4(γ+1)k2θ
= 2γk
2θ+3+(γ+1)k2θ+2`′ · e
1
12(γ+1)k2θ
+ 1
2
ln 4pi(γ+1)k2θ+2(γ+1)k2θ
(3.43)
`′=κk
= exp
{
(3 + (2γ + 1)k2θ + 2κk) ln 2 (3.44)
+
1
12(γ + 1)k2θ
+
1
2
ln 4pi(γ + 1) + θ ln k − 2(γ + 1)k2θ
}
(3.45)
Since k2θ ln 2 > 0 and ek
2θ ln 2 ≥ 1 we multiply equation (3.45) with ek2θ ln 2.
Furthermore, using the fact that
f(k) = 2κk ln 2 + θ ln k +
1
12(γ + 1)k2θ
+ 3 ln 2 +
1
2
ln 4pi(γ + 1) = o(k2), (3.46)
since
lim
k→∞
f(k)
k2
= lim
k→∞
2κk ln 2θ ln k + 1
12(γ+1)k2θ
+ 3 ln 2 + 12 ln 4pi(γ + 1)
k2
= 0, (3.47)
equation (3.45) becomes:
exp
{
(2γ + 1)k2θ ln 2− 2(γ + 1)k2θ + 2κk ln 2 + θ ln k (3.48)
+
1
12(γ + 1)k2θ
+ 3 ln 2 +
1
2
ln 4pi(γ + 1)
}
(3.49)
≤ exp
{
2(γ + 1)(ln 2− 1)k2θ + o(k2)
}
(3.50)
= exp
{
−
(
2(γ + 1)(1− ln 2)k2θ − o(k2)
)}
. (3.51)
Thus
PF,G;S, T
(
∃M˜ ∈ W˜ , s.t. M˜ is δ-non-negligible, and ∃β s.t. |Rβ(M˜)| ≥ λ
)
≤ e−Ω(k2θ). (3.52)
Equation (3.52) implies that with high probability over F and G,
∀M˜ ∈ W˜ , (M˜ is δ-non-negligible)⇒ |Rβ(M˜)| ≤ λ. (3.53)
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Thus Protocol 3.1 is secure in the case where the adversary observes any measurement outcome
in the set W˜ .
3.2.3 Approximating Measurement Outcomes
We now show that any measurement outcome M can be approximated by another measurement
outcome M˜ , just as in [Liu15].
First, we introduce a lemma proved and used in [Liu15] that shows that ifM is 2δ−non-negligible
then M˜ is δ−non-negligible.
Lemma 3.9. [Liu15, Lemma 3.6] Suppose that M,M˜ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m, and 0  M  I, and
0  M˜  I. Suppose that M is 2δ−non-negligible, where 0 < δ ≤ 12 , and tr(M) ≥ 1. Suppose
that M˜ satisfies ‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, where µ ≤ 23δ · 2−m. Then M˜ is δ−non-negligible.
The next lemma shows that if the quantity Rβ(M˜) is defined in terms of an event E˜ , we can
define the quantity Rβ(M) by choosing E such that Rβ(M) ≈ Rβ(M˜).
Lemma 3.10. Suppose that M,M˜ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m, and 0 M  I, and 0  M˜  I. Suppose that
M is 2δ-non-negligible, where 0 < δ ≤ 12 , and ‖M‖ = 1. Suppose that M˜ satisfies ‖M − M˜‖ ≤
µ, where µ ≤ 12 , and M˜ is δ-non-negligible.
Suppose there exists an event E˜, occurring with probability P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜); and let Rβ(M˜) be
defined in terms of E˜, as shown in equation (3.10).
Then there exists an event E, occurring with probability P (E|Z = M) = P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜), such that
if Rβ(M) is defined in terms of E, then the following statement holds:
|Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜)| ≤ 2µ
(
2m
δ
)2
. (3.54)
Proof. By assumption, there is an event E˜ , defined by the probabilities P (E˜ | Z˜ = M˜, S =
s, T = t). Let ρst be the quantum state used to encode messages (s, t), i.e., this is the state of
the one-time memory, conditioned on S = s and T = t.
We start by writing Rβ(M˜) in a more explicit form. First consider Rβ(M˜), and note that
A0 = F (S), A1 = G(T ) and s, t are chosen uniformly at random. We can write R
β(M˜) in the
form:
Rβ(M˜) =
1
P (Z˜ = M˜)
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ , S = s, T = t, Z˜ = M˜)
=
1
P (Z˜ = M˜)
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ , | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) tr(M˜ρst) 4−`
=
1
P (Z˜ = M˜)
tr(M˜ν),
(3.55)
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where we define the matrix ν ∈ (C2×2)⊗m as follows:
ν = 4−`
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ | Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst. (3.56)
The trace norm of ν is ‖ν‖tr = tr(
√
νν†). But note that
ν† =
(
4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst
)†
(3.57)
= 4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρ†st (3.58)
Since density operators are self-adjoint ρ†st = ρst. Then
ν† = 4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst = ν. (3.59)
Then the trace norm is:
‖ν‖tr = tr(4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ρst) (3.60)
= 4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) tr(ρst) (3.61)
Since ρst is a density operator tr(ρst = 1) and because
P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ≤ 1 (3.62)
⇒ (−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ≤ 1 (3.63)
⇒
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ≤ 4l (3.64)
we get:
‖ν‖tr = 4−l
∑
s,t
(−1)β(F (s),G(t))P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) ≤ 4−l · 4l. (3.65)
Thus ‖ν‖tr ≤ 1.
In addition, we can rewrite P (Z˜ = M˜) in the following way:
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P (Z˜ = M˜) =
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
P (Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t)
=
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
tr(M˜ρst) 4
−`
= tr
M˜
4−` ∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
ρst

= tr(M˜ξ),
(3.66)
where we define the matrix ξ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m as follows:
ξ = 4−`
∑
s,t∈{0,1}`
ρst. (3.67)
Also, note that ‖ξ‖tr ≤ 1.
Taking into account equation (3.55) and equation (3.66) we can rewrite Rβ(M˜) as
Rβ(M˜) =
tr(M˜ν)
tr(M˜ξ)
, (3.68)
where ν, ξ ∈ (C2×2)⊗m satisfy ‖ν‖tr ≤ 1 and ‖ξ‖tr ≤ 1.
We now consider the measurement outcome M . We construct an event E in order to define the
quantity Rβ(M). The event E conditioned on Z = M behaves similarly to E˜ conditioned on
Z˜ = M˜ .
We now construct the event E . For a fixed measurement outcome M and for all s, t ∈ {0, 1}`
we define:
P (E|Z = M,S = s, T = t) = P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜, S = s, T = t) (3.69)
Note that this implies P (E|Z = M) = P (E˜ |Z˜ = M˜). Using this we can rewrite the quantitiy
Rβ(M) in a similar way as Rβ(M˜):
Rβ(M) =
tr(Mν)
tr(Mξ)
, (3.70)
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where ν and ξ are the same matrices used to express Rβ(M˜) in equation (3.68). In addition,
we can lower-bound tr(Mξ) and tr(M˜ξ) as follows:
tr(Mξ) ≥ 2δ · 2−m tr(M) ≥ 2δ · 2−m‖M‖ (3.71)
≥ 2δ · 2−m, (3.72)
tr(M˜ξ) ≥ δ · 2−m tr(M˜) (3.73)
≥ δ · 2−m‖M˜‖ (3.74)
≥ δ · 2−m(1− µ) ≥ δ · 2−m · 12 . (3.75)
Where we used that M is 2δ-non-negligible, M˜ is δ−non-negligible and the inequalities (3.85)
and (3.78).
Note that we use equation (3.86) and ‖M‖ = 1 to get:
‖M‖ = ‖M − M˜ + M˜‖ ≤ ‖M − M˜‖+ ‖M˜‖ (3.76)
=⇒ 1 ≤ µ+ ‖M˜‖ (3.77)
=⇒ ‖M˜‖ ≥ 1− µ (3.78)
We also used the fact that µ ≤ 23 · δ · 2−m, δ ≤ 12 and m ≥ k ≥ k0 ≥ 1 (as defined in [Liu15]) to
lower bound 1− µ as follows:
1− µ ≥ 1− 2
3
· δ · 2−m ≥ 1− 1
3
· 2−m ≥ 1− 1
6
≥ 1
2
(3.79)
Now we can write Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜) as follows:
Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜) = tr(Mν)
tr(Mξ)
− tr(M˜ν)
tr(M˜ξ)
(3.80)
=
tr(Mν)
tr(Mξ)
− tr(M˜ν)
tr(Mξ)
+
tr(M˜ν)
tr(Mξ)
− tr(M˜ν)
tr(M˜ξ)
(3.81)
=
tr(Mν)− tr(M˜ν)
tr(Mξ)
+
tr(M˜ν) tr(M˜ξ)
tr(Mξ) tr(M˜ξ)
− tr(M˜ν) tr(Mξ)
tr(Mξ) tr(M˜ξ)
(3.82)
=
tr((M − M˜)ν)
tr(Mξ)
+ tr(M˜ν)
tr((M˜ −M)ξ)
tr(Mξ) tr(M˜ξ)
. (3.83)
We can then upper-bound this quantity:
|Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜)| ≤ µ
2δ · 2−m + (1 + µ)
µ
2δ · 2−m · δ · 2−m · 12
=
µ
2δ · 2−m
(
1 +
(1 + µ)
δ · 2−m · 12
)
≤ 2µ
(
2m
δ
)2
.
(3.84)
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.10.
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From Lemma 3.10 we can show that Protocol 3.1 is secure, when the adversary observes any
separable measurement outcome M ∈W that is 2δ-non-negligible.
Note that ‖M‖ = 1 (that is assumed without loss of generality [Liu15]) implies tr(M) ≥ 1:
tr(M) ≥ 1 (3.85)
Let M˜ ∈ W˜ be the nearest point in the µ-net W˜ . Then we have:
‖M − M˜‖ ≤ µ, (3.86)
where µ = 2−(α/2)k δ
2
4m .
Then from Lemma 3.9, M˜ is δ-non-neglibible. Then from equation (3.53) we get that |Rβ(M˜)| ≤
λ, where λ = 2−(α/2)k · 2r:
−2−α2 k · 2r ≤ Rβ(M˜) ≤ 2−α2 k · 2r. (3.87)
Using Lemma 3.10 and substituting µ we get that:
|Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜)| ≤ 2µ
(
2m
δ
)2
= 2 · 2−(α/2)k (3.88)
=⇒ −2 · 2−(α/2)k ≤ Rβ(M)−Rβ(M˜) ≤ 2 · 2−(α/2)k. (3.89)
By adding equations (3.87) and (3.89) we get:
−2−(α/2)k · 2(r + 1) ≤ Rβ(M) ≤ 2−(α/2)k · 2(r + 1) (3.90)
=⇒ |Rβ(M)| ≤ 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1) (3.91)
Then from Lemma 3.7 we see that Protocol 3.1 is secure for all 2δ-non-negligible measurement
outcomes M ∈W that a dishonest user Bob may observe:
‖Pβ(A0,A1)E|Z=M − PU‖ ≤ 2−
α
2
k · 2(r + 1) + ε = 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1) + 2−ε0k ≤ 2−Ω(k). (3.92)
Consider any LOCC adversary, and let Z be the random variable representing the measurement
outcome. We can then write:
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‖Pβ(A0,A1)Z − PU × PZ‖
≤
∑
M
P (Z = M)‖Pβ(A0,A1)|Z=M − PU‖
≤ 2δ +
∑
M :M is 2δ-non-negligible
P (Z = M)‖Pβ(A0,A1)|Z=M − PU‖,
(3.93)
since
∑
M :M is 2δ-negligible P (Z = M) ≤ 2δ.
Taking into account the bound shown in equation (3.92) and the fact that P (¬E|Z = M) ≤ ε,
equation (3.93) becomes
‖Pβ(A0,A1)Z − PU × PZ‖
≤ 2δ + 2ε+
∑
M :M is 2δ-non-negligible
P (Z = M)
(‖Pβ(A0,A1), E|Z=M − PU‖)
≤ 2δ + 2ε+ 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1) + ε
≤ 2 · 2−δ0k + 3 · 2−ε0k + 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1).
(3.94)
Note that in the last step we use the definitions of δ = 2−δ0k and ε = 2−ε0k.
Then Theorem 3.5 with `′ = κk, where 0 < κ < min
{
δ0
2 ,
ε0
2 ,
α
4
}
and
‖Pβ(A0,A1)Z − PU × PZ‖ ≤ 2 · 2−δ0k + 3 · 2−ε0k + 2−
α
2
k · 2(r + 1) = ε
′
22`′+1
, (3.95)
implies that
‖PA1−D AD DZ − PU` × PAD DZ‖ ≤ ε′
≤ 22`′+1 ·
(
2 · 2−δ0k + 3 · 2−ε0k + 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1)
)
≤ 22`′+1 ·
(
2 · 2−δ0k + 4 · 2−ε0k + 2−α2 k · 2(r + 1)
)
≤ 2−δ0k+2`′+2 + 2−ε0k+2`′+3 + 2−α2 k+2`′+2 + 2−α2 k+2`′+2+ln r
≤ 2−(δ0k−2(`′+1)) + 2−(ε0k−2`′+3) + 2−(α2 k−2(`′+1))
+ 2−(
α
2
k−2(`′+2+θ ln k)−ln (γ+1))
(3.96)
Next we examine the term 2−(δ0k−2(`′+1)), since `′ < δ02 k then:
∃c > 0 ∃k′0 : ∀k > k′0 the following holds: δ0k − 2(`′ + 1) ≥ ck (3.97)
=⇒ δ0k − 2(`′ + 1) ∈ Ω(k) (3.98)
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then we have that for sufficiently large k:
2−(δ0k−2(`
′+1)) ≤ 2−Ω(k) (3.99)
In a similar way we get that since `′ < ε02 k then for sufficiently large k:
2−(ε0k−2`
′+3) ≤ 2−Ω(k) (3.100)
Finally since `′ < α4 k then for sufficiently large k
2−(
α
2
k−2(`′+1)) ≤ 2−Ω(k) (3.101)
and
2−(
α
2
k−2(`′+2+θ ln k)−ln (γ+1)) = 2−(
α
2
k−2`′−o(k)) ≤ 2−Ω(k), (3.102)
which holds since
f(k) = 2θ ln k + 4 + ln (γ + 1) ∈ o(k). (3.103)
Thus from equations (3.99), (3.100), (3.101) and (3.102), for sufficiently large k
‖PA1−D AD DZ − PU` × PAD DZ‖ ≤ 2−Ω(k), (3.104)
which completes the proof of Theorem 3.3
Chapter 4
Flavours Of Oblivious Transfer
In the previous chapter, we showed that a secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol can be constructed
in the isolated qubits model. In this chapter we use the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality to construct
protocols that implement more complex oblivious transfer functionalities.
First we present a protocol that implements the
(
2
1
)−OT functionality using an instance of
the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality. As we have already discussed in Chapter 1, an (21)−OT protocol
is sufficient to implement any two-party computation securely, which makes it a fundamental
problem in cryptography.
Secondly, we present a reduction from
(
k
1
)−OT and (k1)−ROT to a series of k (21)−OTs, that
was first introduced in [BCR86].
Finally, we construct a protocol that implements the weaker
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality using only
log k
(
2
1
)−ROT functionalities.
These results are more general as these protocols are not restricted to the isolated qubits model
as they rely on the existence and composability of a secure
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol in a cryptographic
model.
4.1
(
2
1
)−OT from (21)−ROT
In this section, we introduce a protocol that implements the
(
2
1
)−OT functionality making use
of a
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality. A sketch of Protocol 4.1 can be seen in Figure 4.1
Protocol 4.1. A
(
2
1
)−OT protocol between user Alice with inputs A0, A1 ∈ {0, 1}` and user
Bob with input D ∈ {0, 1}.
1. Alice and Bob use a
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality with no input and input D respectively.
2. Alice receives outputs S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}` and Bob receives SD ∈ {0, 1}`.
3. Alice then sends two messages Y0, Y1 such that:
Y0 = S0 ⊕A0 (4.1)
Y1 = S1 ⊕A1 (4.2)
36
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4. Bob then receives output:
XD = YD ⊕ SD (4.3)
Figure 4.1: Sketch of the
(
2
1
)−OT Protocol 4.1 using a (21)−ROT functionality.
We introduce the theorem that states that if the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality is implemented securely,
then so is the
(
2
1
)−OT functionality.
Theorem 4.2. If the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality used in Protocol 4.1 fulfills the ε−security Defi-
nition 2.9, then the
(
2
1
)−OT Protocol 4.1 is ε−secure according to Definition 2.7.
4.1.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
In order to prove Theorem 4.2 we need to show that all the conditions of Definition 2.7 are
fulfilled.
4.1.1.1 Correctness
Proof. If both Alice and Bob are honest, they follow Protocol 4.1.
Then if the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality is implemented correctly Alice will receive outputs S0, S1
and Bob will receive SD except with probability ε.
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After Alice sends Y0, Y1, where Yi = Ai⊕Si, Bob outputs YD ⊕SD = AD, implying correctness
except with probability ε.
4.1.1.2 Security for Alice
Proof. For an honest user Alice, security of the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality implies that there exists
a random variable D′ such that
PS1−D′G′SD′D′ ≈ε PU · PG′SD′D′ , (4.4)
where S0, S1 are the outputs of honest Alice and G
′ is the output of a dishonest user Bob.
Define random variable D′′ = D′, then since an honest user Alice does not use her inputs A0, A1
in the
(
2
1
)−ROT it is clear that
PG′D′′S0S1A0A1 = PG′D′′S0S1 · PA0A1 , (4.5)
which implies that
PD′′A0A1 = PD′′ · PA0A1 . (4.6)
Furthermore equation (4.5) implies that
PG′D′′SD′′A0A1 = PG′SD′′ |D′′ · PD′′ · PA0A1 , (4.7)
and from equation (4.6) we have that
PG′D′′SD′′A0A1 = PG′SD′′ |D′′ · PA0A1D′′ , (4.8)
and
PG′D′′SD′′A0A1 = PG′SD′′ |D′′AD′′ · PAD′′A1−D′′D′′ . (4.9)
Bob’s input G′′ depends on G′, Y0, Y1, where Y0 = S0 ⊕A0 and Y1 = S1 ⊕A1.
Then from equation (4.4) and (4.5) we get
Chapter 4. Flavours Of Oblivious Transfer 39
PS1−D′′G′D′′SD′′AD′′ ≈ε PU · PG′SD′′D′′ · PAD′′ , (4.10)
which implies that
PS1−D′′ |G′D′′SD′′AD′′ ≈ε PU . (4.11)
Then Y1−D′′ is independent of A1−D′′ given G′, D′′, SD′′ , AD′′ and YD′′ = AD′′ ⊕ SD′′ .
Therefore
PY0Y1G′D′′SD′′AD′′A1−D′′ ≈ε PY0Y1|G′D′′SD′′AD′′ · PG′D′′SD′′AD′′ · PA1−D′′ (4.12)
and taking into account equation (4.9)
PY0Y1G′D′′SD′′AD′′A1−D′′ ≈ε PY0Y1|G′D′′SD′′AD′′ · PG′SD′′ |D′′AD′′ · PD′′AD′′A1−D′′ (4.13)
⇒ PG′′D′′AD′′A1−D′′ ≈ε PG′′|D′′AD′′ · PD′′AD′′A1−D′′ (4.14)
Thus, equations (4.6) and (4.14) imply that Protocol 4.1 is secure for Alice.
4.1.1.3 Security for Bob
Proof. If the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality is secure for honest user Bob with input D, there exist
random variables S′0, S′1 such that
P [G = S′D] ≥ 1− ε (4.15)
and
PS′0S′1D ≈ε PS′0S′1PD, (4.16)
where D and G are Bob’s input and output used in F(2
1
)−ROT.
We can then define random variables A′0 = Y0 ⊕ S′0 and A′1 = Y1 ⊕ S′1, where Y0 and Y1 are the
messages sent by Alice to Bob after the
(
2
1
)−ROT.
Then from equation (4.16) and since Alice receives no further information from Bob after the(
2
1
)−ROT has been used it is clear that
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PA′0A′1D ≈ε PA′0A′1PD. (4.17)
Finally since Bob is honest, his output G′ will be G′ = G⊕ YD, which implies that
P [G = A′D] ≥ 1− ε. (4.18)
Thus Protocol 4.1 is secure for Bob.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.2.
4.2
(
k
1
)−OT And (k1)−ROT From (21)−OT
The following
(
k
1
)−OT protocol makes use of k (21)−OT functionalities and was first presented
in [BCR86].
Protocol 4.3. A
(
k
1
)−OT protocol between user Alice with inputs X1, . . . , Xk ∈ {0, 1}` and user
Bob with input D ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
1. Alice chooses strings B1, . . . , Bk ∈ {0, 1}` uniformly at random.
2. Alice inputs A1,0 = B1 and A1,1 = X1 in the first
(
2
1
)−OT. Bob inputs his choice D1 = δ1,D
and receives string A1,D1.
3. For i = 2, . . . , k:
(a) Alice inputs strings Ai,0 = Bi ⊕Bi−1 and Ai,1 = Xi ⊕Bi−1 in the ith
(
2
1
)−OT.
(b) Bob inputs his ith choice Di = δi,D and receives the string Ai,Di
4. Bob receives output:
XD = AD,1 ⊕
D−1⊕
j=1
Aj,0
 (4.19)
It is easy to see that a
(
k
1
)−ROT protocol can be constructed if Alice chooses her input messages
X1, . . . , Xk uniformly at random. A sketch of the security proof for this protocol can be found in
[BCR86]. We present this protocol and its possible extension to a
(
k
1
)−ROT protocol to argue
that indeed such a protocol can be constructed from a secure
(
2
1
)−OT. However, it requires
k (or k − 1)1(21)−OT functionalities. In the next section we present a protocol that fulfills a
weaker security definition but requires only log k
(
2
1
)−ROTs. We will later use that protocol in
Chapter 5 to achieve secure password-based identification.
1This protocol can be implemented using k−1 (2
1
)−OTs if in the last (2
1
)−OT Alice inputs Ak,0 = Bk−1⊕Xk−1
and Ak,1 = Bk−1 ⊕Xk.
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4.3
(
k
1
)− R˜OT from (21)−ROT
4.3.1 Protocol And Security Definition
In this section, we introduce a protocol that implements the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT functionality. While
the following
(
k
1
) − R˜OT protocol fulfills a weaker security definition, it is more efficient than
Protocol 4.3 or its extension to a
(
k
1
)−ROT as it makes use of only log k (21)−ROTs instead of
k
(
2
1
)−OTs.
Alice with no input, receives log k pairs of strings (Ai,0, Ai,1) from the i
th
(
2
1
)−ROT, for
i ∈ {1, . . . , log k}. Her output messages S1, . . . , Sk will later be composed of the possible
additions of these strings, for example S1 =
⊕log k
i=1 Ai,0.
Bob with input D ∈ {1, . . . , k}, that can be seen as a string {D1|D2| . . . |Dlog k}, in turn in-
puts the ith bit of his choice Di to the i
th
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality and obtains output Ai,Di .
He finally adds the outputs he received to obtain his output of the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT funcitonality
SD =
⊕log k
i=1 Ai,Di . A sketch of the protocol can be seen in Figure 4.2.
Protocol 4.4. Sender-randomised
(
k
1
) − R˜OT protocol between user Alice with no input and
user Bob with input D = {D1|D2| . . . |Dlog k} ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
1. For i = 1, . . . , log k:
(a) Alice with no input receives strings Ai,0, Ai,1 ∈ {0, 1}` as outputs of the ith
(
2
1
)−ROT,
(b) Bob inputs his ith choice Di and receives the string Ai,Di.
2. Alice receives outputs:
S1 = A1,0 ⊕A2,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Alog k,0
S2 = A1,1 ⊕A2,0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Alog k,0
...
...
...
Sk = A1,1 ⊕A2,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Alog k,1
(4.20)
and Bob receives output:
SD =
log k⊕
i=1
Ai,Di (4.21)
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Figure 4.2: Sketch of the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT Protocol 4.4 using log k (21)−OT functionalities.
We now introduce the theorem that states that if the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionalities used in the above
protocol are secure, in the sense of Definition 2.7, then the protocol implements the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT
functionality securely, according to the Definition 2.13.
Theorem 4.5. If the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionalities used in Protocol 4.4 are ε−secure, according to
Definition 2.9, then Protocol 4.4 is ε′−secure according to Definition 2.14, where ε′ ≤ ε log k.
4.3.2 Proof Of Theorem 4.4
The following proof consists of three parts as we have to show that all three requirements of
Definition 2.13 hold.
4.3.2.1 Correctness
First we show that the correctness requirement of Definition 2.14 holds if the correctness re-
quirement of Definition 2.9 holds.
Proof. We show that for two honest users who follow Protocol 4.4, the protocol is correct if the(
2
1
)−ROT functionality is implemented correctly.
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An honest user Alice receives outputs (Ai,0, Ai,1) from the i
th
(
2
1
)−ROT used in the protocol,
for i = 1, . . . , log k. She receives outputs S1 . . . Sk by modulo 2 addition of these inputs, for
example S1 =
⊕log k
i=1 Ai,0.
Then Bob with input D = {D1| . . . |Dlog k}, uses Di as input to the ith
(
2
1
)−ROT. If the(
2
1
)−ROTs are correct he receives Ai,Di except with probability ε for all i = 1, . . . , log k.
He then correctly computes XD =
⊕log k
i=1 Ai,Di except with probability ε
′ ≤ ε · log k.
Thus Protocol 4.4 is correct.
4.3.2.2 Security For Alice
Secondly we show that if the
(
2
1
)−ROT are secure for Alice in the sense of Definition 2.9 then
the security for Alice condition of Definition 2.14 holds.
Proof. For an honest user Alice with no input and any dishonest user Bob with output G′ we
can define a random variable D′ such that D′ = {D′1| . . . |D′log k}, where D′i is Bob’s input to
the ith
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality used in the protocol.
Then for all I = {I1| . . . |Ilog k} such that I 6= D′, there exists at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , log k}
such that Ij 6= D′j .
Since the
(
2
1
)−ROTs are secure for Alice for any dishonest user Bob with output G′j there exists
a random variable D′i such that
PAj,IjG
′
jAj,D′
j
D′j ≈ε PU · PG′jAj,D′
j
D′j . (4.22)
Then since SD′ =
⊕log k
i=1 Ai,D′i and SI =
⊕log k
j=1 Aj,Ij for any I 6= D′,
PSIG′SD′D′ ≈ε′ PU · PG′SD′D′ , (4.23)
where ε′ ≤ ε · log k.
Equation (4.23) proves that Protocol 4.4 is secure for Alice according to Definition 2.14.
4.3.2.3 Security For Bob
Finally we show that if the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionalities are secure for Bob according to Defini-
tion 2.9 then Protocol 4.4 is secure for Bob, in the sense of Definition 2.14.
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Proof. For an honest user Bob with input D = {d1| . . . |dlog k} ∈ {1, . . . , k} and any dishonest
user Alice we define random variables S′1, . . . S′k in the following way:
S′I =
log k⊕
j=1
Aj,Ij , for I ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (4.24)
where A′i,0 and A
′
i,1 are the inputs in the i
th
(
2
1
)−ROT used in Protocol 4.4.
Then since the
(
2
1
)−ROTs are secure for Bob there exist random variables A′i,0, A′i,1 such that
for the output of the ith
(
2
1
)−ROT
P [Gi(2
1
)
−OT
= A′i,Di ] ≥ 1− ε, (4.25)
and
PDiA′i,0A′i,1 ≈ε PDi · PA′i,0A′i,1 , (4.26)
for all i = 1, . . . , log k.
Since SD =
⊕log k
j=1 A
′
j,Dj
, (4.25) implies that
P [G(k
1
)− R˜OT = S′D] ≥ 1− ε′, (4.27)
with ε′ ≤ ε · log k.
Furthermore (4.26) implies that the distribution of Di is independent of the inputs of that(
2
1
)−OT. Since a dishonest user Alice receives no information the choices of Bob are independent.
Then since D = {D1| . . . |Dlog k} and S′I =
⊕log k
j=1 A
′
j,Ij
PDS′1...S′k ≈ε′ PD · PS′1...S′k (4.28)
Thus if the
(
2
1
)−OT functionalities used are correct, then Protocol 4.4 is secure, this concludes
the proof of Theorem 4.5.
Chapter 5
Secure Identification
In this chapter, we aim to construct a protocol that achieves secure password-based identifi-
cation. In order to do so, we first study existing protocols, namely the protocol proposed in
[DFSS07], that achieves secure identification in the bounded quantum storage model.
First, we adapt this protocol to the isolated qubits model by using a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, it is possible to construct a
(
k
1
)−OT protocol in this model.
However, we notice that this identification protocol requires interaction from Bob to Alice.
Secondly, we study if it is possible to construct a non-interactive secure identification protocol.
We show that such a protocol is impossible to construct, even based on oblivious transfer.
Finally, we prove the security of an interactive password-based identification protocol that makes
use of a
(
k
1
) − R˜OT functionality. The latter can be implemented efficiently, as we showed in
Chapter 4.
5.1 Secure Identification From
(
k
1
)−OT
There are a number of secure password-based identification protocols in the literature, we present
[DFSS07, Protocol Q-ID] that achieves secure identification in the bounded quantum storage
model. Let c :W 7→ {+,×}n be the encoding function, where + is the computational and × is
the Hadamard basis.
Protocol 5.1. Interactive Password-based Identification with inputs WA and WB, the passwords
of user Alice and user Bob respectively. Let F and H be families of strong 2-universal hash
functions [DFSS07]:
1. The user Alice picks xR ∈ {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n she then sends state |x〉θ to Bob
2. Bob measures |x〉θ in basis D = c(WB). Let XD be the outcome.
3. Alice picks f ∈ F uniformly at random and sends θ and f to Bob. Both compute IW :=
{i : θi = c(W )i}.
4. Bob picks h ∈ H uniformly at random and sends h to Alice.
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5. Alice sends z := f(XWA |IWA ) ⊕ h(WA) to Bob, where XWA |IWA is the restriction of XWA
to the coordinates Xi with i ∈ IWA.
6. Bob accepts if and only if z = f(XD|IWB )⊕ h(WB)
While this protocol is secure in the bounded-quantum storage model, it is not secure in the
isolated qubits model as we have discussed in Chapter 2. Note however that the first part of the
protocol (steps 1-4) can be seen as a protocol that implements the
(
k
1
)−OT functionality. As we
have shown in Chapter 4, there exists a protocol that achieves that in the isolated qubits model.
Taking this fact into account, we construct a password-based identification protocol that relies
on the security of a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality. A sketch of the protocol is presented in Figure 5.1.
Protocol 5.2. Password-based identification protocol with inputs WA and WB, the passwords
of user Alice and user Bob respectively. Let H be a family of strong 2-universal hash functions
such that h ∈ H and h : {1, . . . , k} 7→ {0, 1}`. Then the protocol between Alice and Bob is the
following:
1. The user Alice uses a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality, F(k
1
)−OT, with inputs X1, X2, . . . , Xk ∈ X .
2. The user Bob inputs his choice D = WB to the
(
k
1
)−OT and receives the message XD
3. Bob sends a function h ∈ H to Alice.
4. Alice sends z := XWA ⊕ h(WA) to Bob.
5. The user Bob outputs 1 if z = XD ⊕ h(WB) and 0 otherwise.
In Section 5.3, we will prove the security of a similar protocol that relies on the weaker
(
k
1
)−R˜OT
functionality, that can be implemented efficiently using log k
(
2
1
)−ROT functionalities.
Note however, that both Protocol 5.1 and 5.2 use interaction from Bob to Alice. But if we
assume that we can implement a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality securely and non-interactively, can we
use it to construct a non-interactive secure identification protocol?
5.2 Impossibility Proof
In this section we study if it is possible to construct a non-interactive password-based identi-
fication protocol using a
(
k
1
)−OT. We introduce a general protocol that uses one instance of
the F(k
1
)−OT functionality to implement the identification functionality FID and we then prove
that such a protocol cannot be secure. We aim to emphasize the importance of the interaction
from Bob to Alice (step 4 of Protocol 5.2) in order to implement the identification functionality
securely.
5.2.1 Non-Interactive Password-Based Identification
We formally introduce the protocol later (Protocol 5.3), but we first describe it to give some
intuition and argue why the protocol is a general form for all such possible protocols. The user
Alice has as input a password WA, can choose inputs X1, . . . , Xk to the
(
k
1
)−OT and sends some
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Figure 5.1: Sketch of the password-based identification protocol (Protocol 5.2) that makes
use of a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality.
extra information Y to the user Bob depending on the specific protocol. In Protocol 5.2 for
example, Y is the function f and the message z = f(XWA ⊕ h(WA). The user Bob has as input
his password WB and makes a choice regarding the message he will retrieve from the
(
k
1
)−OT.
His choice D may depend on his password so that if his password choice is equal to the choice
of Alice he will be able to correctly identify her while he will not be able to do so in any other
case. So his choice is described by a deterministic function c : W × Y 7→ {1, . . . , k} such that
D = c(WB, Y ) returns the message that when combined with the information Y will allow him
to check if WA = WB.
We note that any non-interactive protocol that uses the F(k
1
)−OT functionality once has to be
of this form. Since it is non-interactive the user Alice can use the functionality of F(k
1
)−OT once
and at most send some additional information Y . On the other hand the user Bob receives
information Y and can interact with the F(k
1
)−OT functionality by inputing his choice D, that
can at most depend on both Y and his password choice WB. Finally, he can, at most, use WB,
D, XD and Y as inputs to some function g to evaluate the equality function.
Protocol 5.3. Non-interactive identification protocol with inputs WA and WB, the passwords
of user Alice and user Bob respectively :
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1. The user Alice uses the non-interactive
(
k
1
)−OT functionality, F(k
1
)−OT, with inputs
X1, X2, . . . , Xk ∈ X and sends additional information Y to Bob. She chooses the inputs
and additional information uniformly at random from a joint distribution PX1...XkY |WA.
2. The user Bob inputs his choice D = c(WB, Y ) to the
(
k
1
)−OT and receives the message
XD.
3. The user Bob then computes and outputs the acceptance predicate, G:
G = g(WB, XD, Y ) =
{
0, if he rejects,
1, if he accepts.
(5.1)
A non-interactive identification protocol in this
(
k
1
)−OT hybrid model is defined by the following
ingredients: PY X1...Xk|WA , PD|WBY , PG|WBDXDY
In order for Protocol 5.3 to be secure it must fulfill the conditions of the security definition
Definition 2.16. We consider the special case for  = 0 for perfect security of the protocol.We
did not study the case that a non-interactive −secure password-based identification protocol
can be constructed using oblivious transfer. Although studying the  > 0 case remains an
interesting problem for future research, we consider the intuition we collect from the following
proof (Section 5.2.2) sufficient to emphasise the importance of interaction between Bob and
Alice as discussed in Section 5.2.3. This result justifies the use of interaction in the construction
of a secure password-based identification protocol, which is the main goal of this thesis.
Then for users Alice and Bob that hold X1, . . . , Xk, Y and D,XD, Y,G respectively, we can
formulate the following security definition, that is equivalent to Definition 2.16.
Definition 5.4. The non-interactive identification Protocol 5.3 is secure if the following condi-
tions are fulfilled:
Correctness: For honest user Alice and honest user Bob, Bob outputs G = 1 if WA = WB.
Security for Alice: For any dishonest user Bob, for any distribution of WA, there exists a
random variable W ′ that is independent of WA and such that:
PWAW ′Y XD|W ′ 6=WA = PWA↔W ′↔Y XD|W ′ 6=WA (5.2)
Security for Bob: For any dishonest user Alice, for any distribution of WB, there exists a ran-
dom variable W ′ independent of WB such that if
W ′ 6= WB then P [G = 1|WB 6= W ′] = 0, and:
PWBW ′Y X1...Xk|W ′ 6=WB = PWB↔W ′↔Y X1...Xk|W ′ 6=WB (5.3)
The following theorem that states that it is impossible for a protocol that uses one instance of
a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality to implement the identification functionality securely.
Theorem 5.5. If Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure for Alice according to Definition 5.4, then
it is not secure for Bob.
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5.2.2 Proof Of Theorem 5.5
We first introduce some lemmas that we will use later to prove Theorem 5.5.
Lemma 5.6. If Protocol 5.3 is secure for Alice then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} the joint distribution
of the random variables Xi and Y are independent of WA .
Proof. Since Protocol 5.3 is secure for Alice, for all PWA , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} there exists W ′
independent of WA such that:
PWAW ′XiY,W ′ 6=WA = PWA↔W ′↔XiY |W ′ 6=WA . (5.4)
Then by definition:
PWA|W ′XiY,W ′ 6=WA = PWA|W ′,W ′ 6=WA (5.5)
We also note that trivially when W ′ = WA,
PWA|W ′XiY,WA=W ′ = PWA|W ′,WA=W ′ (5.6)
Using the property of the marginal distribution:
PWA|W ′XiY =P [W
′ 6= WA]PWA|W ′XiY,W ′ 6=WA
+ P [W ′ = WA]PWA|W ′XiY,W ′=WA (5.7)
(5.5),(5.6)
= P [W ′ 6= WA]PWA|W ′,W ′ 6=WA + P [W ′ = WA]PWA|W ′,W ′=WA (5.8)
=PWA|W ′ (5.9)
Using the fact that W ′ is independent of WA equation (5.9) becomes:
PWA|W ′XiY = PWA (5.10)
From equation (5.10) we observe that W ′, Xi, Y are independent of WA.
The next lemma states that if Protocol 5.3 is secure for Alice and correct then the function
c(·, y) is injective for all possible y.
Lemma 5.7. If Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure for Alice then for the function c :W×Y → [k]
the following holds:
∀y ∈ Y with PY (y) > 0, c(·, y) is injective. (5.11)
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Proof. Let us assume that the function c(WB, Y ) is not injective.
Then ∃y : PY (y) > 0 and ∃j,m ∈ W with j 6= m such that
c(j, y) = c(m, y). (5.12)
Then clearly,
Xc(j,y) = Xc(m,y), (5.13)
which immediately implies that,
g(j,Xc(m,y), y)
(5.14)
= g(j,Xc(j,y), y). (5.14)
Let us assume that WA = j and WB = m. Since Protocol 5.3 is correct, Bob computes:
g(m,Xc(m,y), Y ) = 0, (5.15)
but also
g(j,Xc(m,y), y)
(5.14)
= g(j,Xc(j,y), y) = 1. (5.16)
This means that for WA 6= WB, Bob learns the password of Alice and thus
PWAW ′Y XD|W ′ 6=WA 6= PWA↔W ′↔Y XD|W ′ 6=WA , (5.17)
which means that Protocol 5.3 is not secure for Alice. Thus if Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure
for Alice the function c(WB, Y ) is injective.
From correctness we expect that for all password inputs w ∈ W thre exists a y ∈ Y and there
exists a x ∈ X that Alice can input in the (k1)−OT and will lead Bob to output G = g(w, x, y) =
1. The following lemma states that it must be so for all y ∈ Y with PY (y) > 0, for all password
inputs w ∈ W simultaneously. Intuitively this is so because otherwise a dishonest user Bob
would gain some information on the password of Alice from the message Y . He could for
example exclude some password choices after seeing Y , making the protocol insecure for Alice.
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Lemma 5.8. If Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure for Alice, then for all w ∈ W, for all y ∈ Y
such that PY (y) > 0 there exists a x ∈ X such that:
g(w, x, y) = 1 (5.18)
Proof. We will prove this lemma by contraposition.
Assume that there exists a w ∈ W and there exists a y ∈ Y with PY |WA(y|w) > 0 such that for
all x ∈ X :
g(w, x, y) = 0 (5.19)
Let WA = WB = w. Then for all x ∈ X
g(w, x, y) = 0, (5.20)
which implies that Protocol 5.3 is not correct.
So far we have shown that if Protocol 5.3 is correct, then for all w ∈ W, for all y ∈ Y :
PY |WA(y|w) > 0 there exists a x ∈ X such that g(w, x, y) = 1.
Furthermore security for Alice implies that PY |WA = PY via Lemma 5.6 and thus we can conclude
that:
For all w ∈ W for all y ∈ Y with PY (y) > 0, there exists a x ∈ X such that:
g(w, x, y) = 1 (5.21)
Note that on the one hand, the information Y Alice sends does not give any information about
her password input, which is necessary to ensure her security. On the other hand, it also means
that Alice does not commit to a password choice by sending the information Y to Bob.
We now prove Theorem 5.5 using the above lemmas. The intuition behind the following proof
is that if the identification Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure for Alice, a dishonest Bob cannot
learn anything about the password of Alice from the output of the
(
k
1
)−OT XD or the additional
information Y alone except for the output G. He also does not learn anything about the other
inputs in the
(
k
1
)−OT, thus allowing a dishonest user Alice to launch an attack by choosing the
inputs to the
(
k
1
)−OT, X1, . . . , Xk, such that each one of them combined with Y will force Bob
to accept for all of his password choices WB. Then Protocol 5.3 is clearly not secure for Bob
since the dishonest user Alice does not need to choose one password WA but can force Bob to
always accept.
Proof. If Protocol 5.3 is correct and secure for Alice, a dishonest user Alice can use the following
attack to force Bob to accept for all of his password choices. Alice inputs WA = 1, chooses a
value for Y honestly and then picks the inputs to the
(
k
1
)−OT, X1, . . . , Xk, such that for every
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password choice WB of the user Bob, he will obtain Xi = Xc(WB,Y ) such that he will output
G = 1.
Attack Strategy Of Dishonest User Alice
1. Alice chooses Y = y (honestly) according to the distribution PY |WA=1, and sends it to
Bob.
2. Alice uses the non-interactive
(
k
1
)−OT functionality, with inputs X1, . . . , Xk that she
chooses as follows.
For every password w ∈ W:
(a) Find a x such that:
PXj |WA=w,Y=y(x) > 0, with j = c(w, y) (5.22)
and
G = g(w, x, y) = 1. (5.23)
(b) Set input Xj = x, with j = c(w, y).
Note that step 2 is possible because correctness and security for Alice imply, via Lemma 5.8,
that for all possible choices of Y and for all possible password choices w ∈ W there exists a
x ∈ X such that G = 1.
Furhtermore, Lemma 5.7 implies that the function c(WB, y) is injective for all y ∈ Y. Then once
y is chosen, for every w ∈ W there exists only one j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, such that j = c(w, y).
These two facts allow a dishonest Alice to choose the inputs of the
(
k
1
)−OT, such that for every
password choice of Bob w ∈ W he retrieves a x ∈ X such that he outputs G = 1.
In more detail, after receiving the
(
k
1
)−OT and Y = y, the honest user Bob chooses a password
WB, inputs his choice D = c(WB, y) to the
(
k
1
)−OT and receives the message XD. As described
above for every one of his password choices he receives a message XD = x such that g(w, x, y) =
1. He then outputs G = g(WB, XD, Y ) = 1 for any of his password choices, which implies that
Protocol 5.3 is not secure for Bob.
5.2.3 The Importance Of Interaction
Theorem 5.5 shows that a non-interactive protocol using one instance of a
(
k
1
)−OT functionality
cannot implement the identification functionality securely. We proved that security for Alice
and correctness of the protocol allow the attack described above to succeed and we claim that
this is true as long as Alice has knowledge of the function g(WB, XD, Y ). This knowledge allows
her to choose the inputs to the
(
k
1
)−OT such that Bob will accept for all of his passwords,
making the protocol insecure.
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It is then interesting to examine where (interactive) protocols that are known to be secure differ.
In the examples of [DFSS07, Protocol Q-ID] and Protocol 5.2 the user Bob sends some informa-
tion to Alice after receiving the
(
k
1
)−OT, in this case a strong 2-universal hash function. This
interaction makes the protocol secure for Bob against the above attack, because the (possibly
extended) function g(WB, XD, Y ) as defined above, is fixed after Alice has chosen her inputs
to the
(
k
1
)−OT. Fixing the function g after Alice has commited to her inputs to the (k1)−OT
denies her the possibility to choose them in such a way that G = 1 for all passwords. Thus we
conclude that as long as the function that is used by Bob to determine the acceptance predicate
is fixed before Alice chooses her inputs to the
(
k
1
)−OT, she can choose the inputs such that the
above attack will work.
Extending the non-interactive Protocol 5.3 by allowing multiple uses of the
(
k
1
)−OT function-
ality, or even
(
k
b
)−OT functionalities from Alice to Bob will still be insecure for Bob as the
function g(·) is fixed before Alice chooses her inputs to the (k1)−OTs. For the same reason, an
interaction from Bob to Alice before she chooses her inputs to the
(
k
1
)−OT would not stop the
above attack from functioning.
5.3 Secure Identification From
(
k
1
)− R˜OT With Interaction
In Section 5.1 we introduced Protocol 5.2, a password-based identification protocol based on a(
k
1
)−OT functionality. The (k1)−OT construction we showed in Chapter 4 is, however, inefficient
as it requires k instances of an
(
2
1
)−OT functionality, where k is the number of passwords.
In this section, we show that one can instead use the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality that only requires
log k
(
2
1
)−OTs. While weaker than the (k1)−OT or (k1)−ROT functionalities, it is sufficient to
achieve security for the password-based identification protocol.
We introduce the password-based identification protocol that relies on the security of a
(
k
1
)−R˜OT
functionality. A sketch of the protocol is shown in Figure 5.2
Protocol 5.9. Password-based identification protocol with inputs WA,WB ∈ W, the passwords
of user Alice and user Bob respectively, where W = {1, . . . , k}. Let H be a family of strong
2-universal hash functions such that h ∈ H and h : W 7→ {0, 1}`. Then the protocol between
Alice and Bob is the following:
1. The users Alice and Bob employ a
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality, F(k
1
)− R˜OT that takes no input
from Alice and input D ∈ W from Bob.
2. The user Alice receives outputs S1, S2, . . . , Sk ∈ S and Bob receives output string SD ∈ S,
where S = {0, 1}`.
3. Bob chooses a function h ∈ H uniformly at random and sends h to Alice.
4. Alice sends z := SWA ⊕ h(WA) to Bob.
5. The user Bob accepts if and only if z = SD ⊕ h(WB) .
We now introduce a theorem that states that the secure identification protocol we propose above
is secure in the sense of Definition 2.16 if the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality used is secure according
to Definition 2.13.
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Theorem 5.10. If there exists a protocol that implements the
(
k
1
)−R˜OT functionality ε−securely
according to Definition 2.14 and the min-entropy of password choices W is Hmin(W ) ≥ 1, then
Protocol 5.9 is ε′−secure in the sense of Definition 2.16, where ε′ = ε+ k2
2`
.
In Chapter 4 we have showed how to construct a secure
(
k
1
)− R˜OT protocol relying on a secure(
2
1
)−ROT. Moreover, in Chapter 3 we have showed that a secure (21)−ROT protocol exists in
the isolated qubits model. Taking these results into account, the previous theorem states that
our password-based identification protocol is secure in the isolated qubits model.
Figure 5.2: Sketch of the password-based identification protocol (Protocol 5.9) that makes
use of a
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality.
5.3.1 Proof Of Theorem 5.10
Finally, in this section, we prove that if the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT used in Protocol 5.9 is secure then the
identification protocol is secure.
5.3.1.1 Correctness
Proof. Honest users Alice and Bob hold inputs WA and WB.
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Following Protocol 5.9 Bob inputs D = WB in the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality which is correct and
thus Bob receives output
G(k
1
)− R˜OT = SD = SWB , (5.24)
except with probability ε.
Then z′ = SD ⊕ h(WB) = SWB ⊕ h(WB).
Since Alice is honest z = SWA ⊕ h(SWA) and thus if WA = WB then z = z′ and Bob will output
G = 1.
Similarly if WA 6= WB Bob will output G = 0 except with probability k22` , the probability that
h(WA) = h(WB) given WA 6= WB.
Thus Protocol 5.9 is correct except with probability ε′ = ε+ k
2
2`
.
5.3.1.2 Security For Alice
Proof. For honest user Alice with input WA and any dishonest user Bob we can define a random
variable W ′ = D′, where D′ is Bob’s input in the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT used in the protocol. Since Bob
has received no information before he decides on his input to the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT, D′ and thus W ′
are independent of the input WA that honest Alice holds.
Furthermore WA is independent of the messages S1, . . . Sk that Alice receives from the
(
k
1
)−R˜OT
since she has chosen it before receiving any output from the
(
k
1
)− R˜OT and the latter takes no
input from Alice.
From the above it is clear that if W ′ 6= WA and since W ′ = D′ then
PWAW ′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA = PWA↔W ′↔SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA . (5.25)
Furthermore from the security of
(
k
1
) − R˜OT, there exists a random variable D′ such that for
all I 6= D′ the following holds
PSID′SD′ |D′ 6=I ≈ε PU · PD′SD′ |D′ 6=I . (5.26)
Then for I = WA and WA 6= W ′ equation (5.26) becomes,
PSWAW
′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA ≈ε PU · PW ′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA . (5.27)
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Consider the random variable Z = SWA ⊕ h(WA) that describes the message Alice sends to
Bob after receiving the hash function h. Taking into account that WA is independent of W
′, D′
and S1, . . . , Sk, including SW ′ and SWA , conditioned on the event W
′ 6= WA Then from the
properties of the modulo 2 addition and equation (5.27) we have that
PZWAW ′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA ≈ε PU · PWAW ′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA . (5.28)
From equation (5.25) the above can be written as:
PZWAW ′SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA ≈ε PU · PWA↔W ′↔SW ′ |W ′ 6=WA (5.29)
≈ε PWA↔W ′↔ZSW ′ |W ′ 6=WA (5.30)
≈ε′ PWA↔W ′↔ZSW ′ |W ′ 6=WA , (5.31)
with ε′ = ε+ k
2
2`
.
Then Protocol 5.9 is ε′−secure for Alice.
5.3.1.3 Security For Bob
Proof. Since the
(
k
1
)−R˜OT functionality, that is implemented by an honest user Bob with input
D = WB and a dihonest user Alice, is secure for Bob, there exist random variables S
′
1, . . . , S
′
k
such that
PDV ′S′1...S′k ≈ε PD · PV ′S′1...S′k . (5.32)
It is clear that V ′, S′1, . . . , S′k are independent of WB.
We then define Zi = S
′
i⊕h(i) for i ∈ W. Consider the event E that all Zi’s are distinct. Since h is
strong 2-universal and is also independent of S′i the Zi’s are pairwise independent. Then from the
union bound it follows that the event E occurs except with probability k(k−1)/2·1/2` ≤ k2/2`+1.
We define random variable W ′ such that the message sent by Alice Z = SW ′⊕h(W ′). If Z 6= Zi
for all i then we set W ′ = ⊥ and honest Bob always outputs G = 0 regardless of his password
choice WB. In this case a dishonest user Alice learns nothing about WB. Similarly from the way
that W ′ is defined Bob will output G = 1 if W ′ = WB.
Note that from security of the
(
k
1
) − R˜OT functionality, and since h is picked uniformly at
random, W ′ is independent of WB. This further implies that Z1, . . . , Zk, Z are also independent
of WB. Moreover since the event E is determined by the Zi’s it also holds that Z1, . . . , Zk, Z
are independent from WB conditioned on the event E and even given W ′ conditioned on E and
W ′ 6= WB.
Now consider Z1, . . . , Zk, Z,G, if W
′ 6= WB and event E then Bob outputs G = 0 with probability
P [G = 0|W ′ 6= WB, E ] = 1. Then Z1, . . . , Zk, Z,G are independent of WB given W ′ conditioned
on the event W ′ 6= WB and E , that is:
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PWBW ′Z1...ZkZG|W ′ 6=WB,E ≈ε PWB↔W ′↔Z1...ZkZG|W ′ 6=WB,E . (5.33)
We then define p = P [E|W ′ 6= WB] and p = P [E|W ′ 6= WB]. Note that P [E ] ≤ k2/2`+1.
Furthermore since Hmin(W ) ≥ 1 it is easy to see that P [W ′ = WB] ≤ 12 . Then
p = P [E|W ′ 6= WB] = P [E ]
1− P [W ′ = WB] ≤ 2P [E ] ≤
k2
2`
. (5.34)
Note that p upperbounds the probability P [G = 1|W ′ 6= WB] ≤ p ≤ k22` ≤ ε′, where ε′ = ε+ k
2
2`
,
fulfilling the first condition for security.
From basic probability theory and using equation (5.33) :
PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB = p · PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E + p · PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E (5.35)
≈ε p · PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E + p · PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E (5.36)
Finally note that E is independent of WB and W ′ and thus also when conditioned on W ′ 6= WB,
then from conditional independence
PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB = p · PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E + p · PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E .
(5.37)
The distance between two probability distributions is upper-bounded by one by definition. Then
so is the distance between PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E and PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB,E .
Thus the distance between PWBW ′Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB and PWB↔W ′↔Z′1...Z′kZG|W ′ 6=WB is upper-bounded
by p+ ε ≤ k2/2` + ε = ε′.
Then since Alice’s output V ′ is defined by Z1, . . . , Zk, Z,G:
PWBW ′V ′|W ′ 6=WB ≈ε′ PWB↔W ′↔V ′|W ′ 6=WB . (5.38)
Thus Protocol 5.9 is secure for Bob.
Thus Protocol 5.9 is secure. We note that this protocol is more efficient than the previous
identification protocols, because of the more efficient construction of
(
k
1
) − R˜OT compared to
the
(
k
1
)−ROT protocol presented in Chapter 4.
Chapter 6
Conclusions & Discussion
In this final chapter, we summarise our main results and conclusions. Then we open the dis-
cussion of these results in relation to current knowledge. Finally, we pose some of the questions
that arise from this discussion and propose possible future steps.
6.1 Conclusions & Discussion
In Chapter 3 we presented a secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT in the isolated qubits model, using the
“leaky” OTM presented in [Liu14b]. We note that our proof follows a similar path to the one
used in [Liu15], but makes use of the notion of non-degenerate linear functions coupled with the
results of [DFSS06]. The resulting proof is simpler than the original and allows us to construct
a secure string
(
2
1
)−ROT in the IQM. This comes at a cost, by using Theorem 3.5 security
is achieved with an error 22`
′+1 times larger than the one presented in [Liu15]. Fortunately,
as shown in equation (3.96), this factor does not influence the security result. However, The-
orem 3.3 implies that the security parameter k has to be of the order of `′ in order for the
protocol to achieve security.
In Chapter 4 we made the first attempt to study more complex two-party functionalities in
this model. We propose secure
(
2
1
)−OT, (k1)−OT and (k1) − R˜OT protocols that rely on the
security and composability of an
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality. In order to guarantee composability
of the
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol, we restricted the users to measure at the end of each protocol. These
protocols can then be implemented in the isolated qubits model using an
(
2
1
)−ROT protocol
that is secure in that model, such as Protocol 3.1 presented in Chapter 3.
The question that then arises is if the aforementioned assumption is realistic. Since compos-
ability of protocols has not been studied in the isolated qubits this questions remains an open
problem for further study and we will briefly discuss this in the next section.
Following that, in Chapter 5 we address an interesting problem of secure two-party computation,
the evaluation of the equality function. We present a protocol for secure password-based identi-
fication that uses a
(
k
1
)− R˜OT functionality, motivated by the protocols proposed in [DFSS07].
However, the results of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are not limited by the specific cryptographic
model, they can be implemented in any model in which there exists a protocol that implements
the
(
2
1
)−ROT functionality securely and in a composable way.
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An interesting question that we encountered on the way is if it is possible to construct non-
interactive secure password-based identification protocols. In Section 5.2, we proved construct-
ing such a protocol based on oblivious transfer is impossible. The interaction from Bob to Alice
must define the way he computes his output in order for the protocol to be secure against the
attack we presented in Section 5.2.
Moreover, we claim that this result is not restricted to the secure evaluation of the equality
function but also applies to more (or even all) secure-function-evaluation problems. For example
in the similar problem of Yao’s millionaire problem where Bob computes a different function,
a dishonest user Alice still has the ability to predetermine the output for all of her inputs, as
long as Bob’s function is not determined after she has commited to her inputs.
6.2 Future Work
This thesis studies the construction of a secure string
(
2
1
)−OT protocol if the users are restricted
to operations on single qubits and classical communication between them and gives examples of
possible applications to construct more complex secure two-party computation protocols such
as password-based identification. This leads of course to new questions that remain an open
challenge for the future.
As we mentioned in the last section, studying if composability holds in the IQM is likely the
most interesting problem that arises from this thesis. If it is shown to be so, we have shown that
a secure
(
2
1
)−OT construction is possible in the IQM, which would imply that any secure two-
party computation functionality can be implemented. If however composability does not hold
in the IQM, then constructing and analysing protocols in this model would prove an exciting
challenge in itself. For example, the problem of analysing the security of two parallel
(
2
1
)−OTs
and modelling the measurement strategies of an adversary who is allowed to partially measure
qubits from the first and second
(
2
1
)−OT and adapt his measurement strategy depending on
partial results of each
(
2
1
)−OT seems to be a first challenge for further research.
As we have already described in Chapter 1 there are numerous results that prove the impossibil-
ity of oblivious transfer in a fully quantum world. Nevertheless, there exist different approaches
to restrict the users in a realistic fashion and achieve oblivious transfer. One of the most inter-
esting questions that arises from this train of thought is to find the minimal and most realistic
restrictions or assumptions needed to achieve secure
(
2
1
)−OTs. For example, Liu has the ques-
tion of allowing a number of entangling operations on the isolated qubits in [Liu15], which could
be a possible approach to generalise the isolated qubits model.
We have discussed in more detail two approaches to limit an adversary, restricting him to
single-qubit operations or restricting his qubit-storage capacity. So far, existing protocols that
are secure against one type of adversary are not secure against the other. The question then
is, could we construct protocols that combine the power of these two models? For example
using a
(
2
1
)−OT that is secure in the IQM and one that is secure in the noisy-storage model
to construct one
(
2
1
)−OT that is secure in both models and using the modulo 2 addition of
their outputs? This would then mean that the adversary would need to both have larger qubit
storage capacities, in order to break the noisy-storage model
(
2
1
)−OT security and be able to
perform entangling operations on the qubits he receives, in order to break the isolated qubits
model
(
2
1
)−OT security.
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As a further approach to combine these models, Liu has addressed the question of allowing a
number of entangling operations on the isolated qubits in [Liu15]. This could be the first step
to define a more general model and should be investigate further.
One further possibility for future endeavours that arises from our impossibility proof in Sec-
tion 5.2.2 is to examine if our result indeed applies to more non-interactive two-party protocols.
However, there exist results that state that quantum one-time programs can be constructed from
one-time memories [? ]. We conjecture that there is a lower-bound on the number of one-time
memories needed to construct a secure one-time program for password-based identification so
that both results hold. Unfortunately we did not to study this into more detail in this thesis
and we leave it as an open question.
Furthermore, we leave the task of extending the impossibility proof to the error case as discussed
in Section 5.2.1 as an open problem for the future. Our intuition is that the attack described
in the proof should function since interaction from Bob to Alice seems to be necessary to
achieve security for Bob. Nevertheless formalising this intuition is an interesting extension of
the impossibility proof discussed in this thesis.
Appendix A
Probability Theory
A.1 Probability Theory
A.1.1 Random Variables
The probability distribution of a random variable X that takes values x ∈ X is a function
PX : X 7→ [0, 1] and is defined as:
PX(x) := P [X = x],∀x ∈ X (A.1)
Note that for every probability distribution the following holds:∑
x∈X
PX(x) = 1 (A.2)
The joint probablity distribution of two random variables X and Y that take values x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y respectively, is defined as:
PXY (x, y) := P [X = x, Y = y], (A.3)
and indicates the probability that X takes the value x and Y takes the value y simultaneously.
Let PXY be the joint distribution of random variables X and Y . Then the distribution of X can
be obtained by marginalising over Y . The distribution PX is then called a marginal distribution:
PX(x) =
∑
y∈Y
PXY (x, y) ∀x ∈ X . (A.4)
Let PXY be the joint of random variables X and Y . If X and Y are independent random
variables the joint distribution can be written as:
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PXY (x, y) = PX(x) · PY (y) ∀x ∈ X , ∀y ∈ Y. (A.5)
Furthermore, the conditional probability distribution of a random variable X takes the value
x ∈ X given the event that the random variable Y takes the value y ∈ Y is defined as:
PX|Y (x|y) :=
PXY (x, y)
PY (y)
. (A.6)
Moreover we introduce the symbol PX↔Y↔Z , as used in [DFSS07] and [FS09], to denote that
the distribution of a random variable X is independent of a random variable Z given a random
variable Y :
PX|Y Z = PX|Y (A.7)
Then we write:
PXY Z = PX↔Y↔Z (A.8)
This notation is extended to PXY Z|E = PX↔Y↔Z|E to denote that the distribution of a random
variable X is independent of a random variable Z given a random variable Y conditioned on an
event E :
PX|Y ZE = PX|Y E (A.9)
Boole’s inequality The union bound or Boole’s inequality states that the probability of at
least one event occuring cannot be greater than the sum of the probabilities of all individual
events.
Formally for a set of events A1, A2, . . . the following inequality holds:
P
(⋃
i
Ai
)
≤
∑
i
P (Ai) (A.10)
Finally, the expected value of a random variable X that takes values x ∈ X is defined as:
E(x) =
∑
x∈X
x · PX(x) (A.11)
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A.1.2 Uniform Distribution
If a random variable X is uniformly distributed it means that all of its values are equiprobable.
Definition A.1. A random variable X that takes values x ∈ X is uniformly distributed if its
distribution PX is of the following form:
PX(x) =
1
|X | ∀x ∈ X (A.12)
Then PX is a uniform distribution over X .
A.1.3 -Net
Intuitively an -net is a subset of some normed space such that for every point of the original
space there is some point in the -net that is -close to it. We now introduce the formal definition
of an -net.
Definition A.2. Let E be a subset of some normed space, with norm ‖ · ‖ and let  > 0. Then
E˜ is an -net for E if E˜ ⊂ E, and for all x ∈ E, there exists some y ∈ E˜ such that:
‖x− y‖ ≤  (A.13)
Appendix B
Measures of Uncertainty
B.1 Renyi Entropy
Definition B.1. For a random variable X that takes values x ∈ X , for α ∈ R with α ≥ 0 and
α 6= 1, the Renyi entropy of order α is defined as
Hα(X) :=
1
1− α log
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α
)
(B.1)
We note that the Renyi entropy is a generalised entropy.
For α = 1 we obtain the Shannon entropy:
H1(X) := −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) log (PX(x)) (B.2)
For α = 0 we obtain the max-entropy:
H0(X) := log |X | (B.3)
B.2 Min-Entropy
One important measure of uncertainty for information theory is the Renyi entropy we get for
α→∞, namely the min-entropy:
H∞(X) := min
x∈X
[− logPX(x)] (B.4)
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It is the smallest of the Renyi entropies of order α and thus the most conservative estimate of
uncertainty in a random variable. This is the reason why it is widely used in cryptography.
Similarly one can define the conditional min-entropy
H∞(X|Y ) := min
x∈X , y∈Y
[− logPX|Y (x|y)] (B.5)
B.3 Smoothed Min-Entropy
The smoothed min-entropy defined below can be understood as the entropy of a distribution
PX that is smoothed by cutting a probability mass ε from the largest probabilities.
Hε∞(X) := maxE:P (E)≥1−ε
min
x∈X
[− logPX(x)] (B.6)
Informally one can think of it as the maximum min-entropy available in any distribution that
is ε-close to the distribution PX .
Furthermore the smoothed conditional min-entropy is defined as:
Hε∞(X|Y ) := maxE:P (E)≥1−ε minx∈X , y∈Y
[− logPX|Y (x|y)] (B.7)
The latter is an important measure in cryptography as it defines the maximum amount of
randomness that is available from X given Y and S, except with probability ε.
Appendix C
Linear Algebra
C.1 Norms
For any matrix A ∈ Cm×n and vector x ∈ Cn we define the following norms:
Operator norm
‖A‖ = max
‖x‖=1
‖Ax‖ (C.1)
Trace norm
‖A‖tr = tr(
√
AA†) (C.2)
Statistical Distance Let P and Q be two probability distributions of a random variable X
that takes values x ∈ X . Then the `1 distance between them is defined as:
‖P −Q‖ =
∑
x
|P (x)−Q(x)| . (C.3)
This is commonly called the statistical distance and is used as a distance measure between the
two probability distributions.
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